

FORMATION OF POLITICAL ELITE OF THE ARABIC WORLD ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARAB SPRING (CASES OF POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF POLITICAL ELITE EGYPT, LIBYA, TUNISIA AND YEMEN)

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ABSTRACT

This article is a study that explores the transformation processes that began in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and elsewhere in the Arab world in 2011 following the uprisings commonly referred to as the Arab Spring. The originality of this work is that article presents the investigated information in such a way that the processes that occurred are not conceptualized as linear, and it also views events not as centrally conceived transitions from authoritarian orders to predetermined outcomes, but rather as contested and unconstrained transformations.

The novelty of the scientific work is that the political processes of transformation, which began in particular in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen and continued in other countries after the "Arab Spring" in 2011. This is best understood through an actor-centered approach that focuses on the choices and strategies of a "politically relevant elite" (PRE) and its interaction with citizens seeking to exert influence, described here as a "mobilized public. The PRE perceived transformation processes as mechanisms for maximizing political resources and monopolizing power. This is best understood through an actor-centered approach that focuses on the choices and strategies of a "politically relevant elite" and its interaction with citizens seeking to exert influence, described here as a "mobilized public". The increasingly polarized controversy that followed has accelerated the co-optation and instrumentalization of the mobilized public by the PRE. It meant the end of their ability to offer opportunities for broad participation in the bottom-up hierarchy and set the stage for a resumption of top-down control in Egypt and Tunisia, and for state failure and civil wars in Libya and Yemen. An important conclusion of the article is the opinion that even given the potential for political change that was to become part of political life in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen in particular, their political power is distributed when, over time and with the help of counter-revolutionary mechanisms, the dividing power has become a consolidated class that strengthens its privileged position against a pluralistic society, deprived of all its political possibilities.

Keywords: Politically Relevant Elites, The Public, Authoritarianism, Political Governance.

INTRODUCTION

It is important to note that the first quarter of the new millennium for the Arab world is characterized not only by destructive, but also by creative processes that covered all spheres of

public life. The complexity and duration of creation is due to the need to constantly adjust the goals set, the formulated tasks, turning the search for optimal options for achieving them into a creative process. The inclusion of man in an active creative activity does not exclude the struggle of creative and destructive forces, which can be "curbed" by individuals who have both a high level of professionalism and real power to influence political processes taking place in the life of society (Abdelrahman, 2013).

The unrest that has rocked the Arab world since December 2010, often belongs to the "Arab Spring" category, has accelerated dynamics of change and conflict, ranging from gradual or partial reforms to authoritarian restraints, exacerbated internal conflict and all-out civil war. In four Arab countries- Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, the main officials of the states, personifying the authoritarian regimes and who have been in power for more than a decade, were forced to leave their posts due to a combination of popular movements, military defections, or coups. The exception was Tunisia. It should be noted that external interference in the policies of these countries ranged from verbal encouragement (Egypt) to reliable mediation and the threat of sanctions (Yemen) or military intervention (Libya) (Ahmed & Capoccia, 2014).

As a result, these four countries are undergoing protracted transformation processes. While the trajectories of these transformations took different forms, they were all marked by several major problems.

First, it was not possible to reach consensus on the key components and principles of the new order. Democratic representation, good governance, and the rule of law have been declared, or at least assumed, goals of transformation processes. Nevertheless, in fact, an intense struggle for power and competition for influence in elected and executive institutions prevailed in political processes (Holger & Schlumberger, 2004).

Conflicts over allegedly incompatible values, as well as memories of the past and fear of future marginalization and victimization have influenced the behavior of virtually all actors involved in socio-political processes as well as public attitudes toward them. There has been a change in the attitude of society towards the ongoing transformations. Consequently, the most important politicians, for the most part, failed to reach a consensus on the direction, depth and speed of change.

Second, countries in the process of transformation have experienced a weakened capacity for central state control, governance, and policy making, rather than better or more efficient governance. With the disappearance of the old main elites, the institutions of the central state have lost some of their ability to control society and provide security throughout the country. They have also become hotbeds of discord in the struggle for power, influence and access to resources (Arato, 1981).

Fierce competition for control of government institutions has prevented the consensus needed to reform them, as actors feared that rivals would use such reforms to establish their own dominance.

This struggle also left very little opportunity and interest in policymaking among decision makers, obliterating the common ground for pragmatic cooperation between them. This problem is particularly acute in the security sector.

Political violence shook Tunisia and Egypt in 2012 and 2013 and remains a serious threat to both countries. The ability of Libyan and Yemeni state institutions to control paramilitary non-

state actors seemed almost non-existent, and in late 2014 the territorial integrity of both countries was at stake (Gideon, 2003).

Third, the emerging orders and new rulers failed to achieve widespread legitimacy that is why the controversial policy remained in place. Against the backdrop of the uprisings, obtaining a popular mandate became an important condition for legitimate government. However, what constitutes the popular mandate and its limits remained controversial, and success in the elections was recognized as only one necessary, but by no means sufficient condition.

Polarization has led some segments of society to challenge the legitimacy of certain actors and accuse them of poor governance. In response, part of the population continued to engage in controversial politics. Strikes, street protests and political violence have become a normal form of political competition. Partially formalized structures and completely informal, local or spontaneous gatherings of citizens carried out decentralized, periodic social protests and remained an unpredictable factor that the new rulers, lacking legitimacy and resources, tried to control (Bayat, 2013). Such groups also became a political resource that warring camps tried to appropriate and use against each other.

These parallels between the different trajectories of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen suggest that a focused and structured analysis of the four occasions of socio-political movement can provide useful insight into the dynamics of the contested transformations of authoritarian political systems initiated by the "*Arab Spring*". It was the socio-political transformations, in spite of the geographical location, that prompted the consideration of Yemen, associated with Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. In addition, the internationally sponsored Transition Pact for Yemen, the so-called Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council, is a test case of an approach to achieving a transformed government model. Much attention of researches and politicians was directed to the consideration of this roadmap, and it was this vector that was proposed as a model for resolving conflicts in other countries of the region (Bayat, 2014).

This article examines the transformation processes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen from the beginning of 2011 to the present. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the Arab uprisings were at the heart of them a gradual but fundamental rejection of the current form of government and polity. In the sense that the institutions of the Weberian state failed to fulfill their most basic principles, such as the redistribution of wealth, functional political representation and the security of its citizens, either cumulatively or with the significant emergence of one of these categories. From this perspective, the goal of the revolutions was not limited to regime change, but more fundamentally questioned the legitimacy of state power, and the quality of the relationship between state and society.

The political order of any state is based on legitimacy. Arab states suffer from a lack of identification and coherence of interaction at several levels. This makes them rather weak elements of the state order. State relations with society are, more often than not, based on coercion, exhausting the ideological justification for the actions of the governing strata. Various advocates outside centralized institutions tend to challenge monopolies of violence, fragmentations of power, and limitations on the power of Arab state formations. Since independence, Arab countries have made enormous efforts to develop their own statehood according to the principles of functionalism and ideals. The vector of these actions is aimed at forming a national identity, as well as a sense of belonging to a "*higher*" community.

A typical problematic feature of Arab states is the frequent absence of an established, historically rooted and widely shared national narrative. It is a plurality of leanings, apart from the state, as a central feature of belonging and identity. Confessional or ethnic, often regionally defined identities rarely form into a single loyalty to a more centralized state.

As analysis shows, only certain institutions, such as the armed forces, have been able to overcome such internal divisions and coalesce into a single national entity. The Lebanese armed forces are a successful example, while the Iraqi army is struggling, bordering on defeat and dependent on confessional (Shiite) militias to defend the state. It should be noted that Arab statehood bears the imprint of post colonialism, which was based on the management of existing territorial units, often inherited from the Ottoman Empire. A typical feature of authoritarian rule is the political role of the armed forces in public affairs, giving a praetorian character to a few leaders. The wars of independence or military coups in the early stages after independence or after World War II paved the way for their permanent role, whether as vanguard (as in Iraq) or more moderate (as in Egypt, Syria and Algeria).

During the postcolonial phase of statehood development, the European model of the nation-state was embraced and adopted by the new ruling elites to avoid significant upheaval during the political transition. Consequently, the issue was not so much the external imposition by their former colonial masters or the artificiality of these states. Rather, such a model was a viable and sustainable solution for the creation of functioning coercive political associations. Thus we can identify the Westphalian and Weberian models, inspired by Europe, which could create consolidated sovereign Arab nation-states. The most powerful contemporary Arab alternative to these projects was the idea of a transnational Arab state, transcending "artificial" borders to create a single sovereign Arab nation-state. The most advanced incarnations of this utopian idea were the short-lived trilateral Arab alliance of Egypt, Syria, and Yemen (1958-61) or the very brief "union" of Tunisia and Libya (1974). However, despite its obvious practical shortcomings, the basic doctrine (Arab nationalism) continued to live on in the Syrian and Iraqi Baath ideologies. At present, the most pronounced alternative proposal to the established Arab state system stems from Islamist ideology (e.g. the ISIS movement), focusing on the confessional element of identity in order to create state structures outside the models of European, Arab or hybrid ideologies. It is currently reaching its apogee with the emergence and promotion of the self-proclaimed "caliphate" of the Islamic State. However, it is not only Western involvement that led to the emergence of new states in the twentieth century. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, quite an "authentic" Arab state, emerged without any direct external role of the colonial powers. On the contrary, the state was created in a vacuum of Ottoman and European power, with the inclusion of the traditional Hijaz state.

As for the states we are considering, the Egyptian state defines its identity in official documents as Muslim and Arab. However, the Copts, who make up about 10% of the total population, are not of Arab ethnic origin and do not practice Islam. They are full and official Egyptian citizens only in a narrow, limited sense, but they support the Egyptian state more strongly than the state's Islamist ideological opponents. In this case there is an official exclusion of the minority from state affairs. Remnants of such an Islamic Ummah can still be found in strong Islamic constitutional references to modern Arab states, such as the exclusion of women or confessional groups from the highest official state positions. Accordingly, state ideology tends to become problematic when other social features work against the nation-state.

If tribal affiliation, even if theoretically included on the basis of a shared broader Arab identity, feels discriminated against, it can escalate into open opposition to the state. This is exemplified by the armed uprising of several tribes in the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula (beginning in the 1990s), later partially taken over by radical Islamists with a change in the original conflict in confessional terms.

It should be noted that this nature of the postcolonial phase of state formation is characterized by the development of huge bureaucratic apparatuses, creating huge castes of civil servants and of course the prominent political role of the military. Their participation as liberation leaders of the coup d'état, as agents of patriotic development, and as organized, well-managed and efficient institutions shaped state structures, developed national identities, and in some cases (Algeria and Egypt) led to privileged and defining positions even today.

As Pace and Cavatorta (2012) note, the events of 2011 triggered a process of "*introspection*" among researches in the region. Democratization theory, long out of fashion due to the apparent failure of economic and political liberalization to generate momentum for democratic governance in many parts of the world, was poised for the resurgence.

Controversy arose over a possible fourth or fifth wave of democratization. Other scholars have put forward more cautious narratives called "*post-democratization*". On the contrary, the notion of authoritarian resilience seemed ripe for serious revision. In addition to offering explanations for popular uprisings and the expulsion of authoritarian rulers, various paradigms also presuppose predictions of subsequent transformations (Bishara, 2018).

Proponents of a post-democratic perspective draw attention to the multidimensional repolarization of Arab societies and the emergence of a vibrant civil society as signs that a return to stable authoritarianism is unlikely (Bovsunivskiy, 2012).

According to Lynch, "*the emergence of troubled, conflicting societies may ultimately be more important than who sits in the presidency*".

Committed to the discourse of democratization and good governance prevalent in international institutions, the authors assume a basic consensus among all local actors involved and present a list of "*achievements*" (and remaining challenges) on the path of political transition. At the same time, the main focus is on institutional processes (Brumberg, 2002; Burova & Korotayev, 2012).

At the same time, chaotic processes and a partial return to authoritarian practice have supported skeptics who view the events after 2011 as another, albeit especially dramatic, episode in the process of authoritarian government (Cammett, et al., 2020). Pessimistic views of transformation processes are also presented through structuralist interpretations that highlight the unfavorable conditions for democratization. The initial electoral successes of Islamist parties sparked new speculation about the alleged incompatibility between democracy and Islamic culture and the predictions of hybrid regimes as the best possible outcome (Challand, 2013; Charrad, et al., 2021).

At the same time, criticism of many studies of political transformation is considered: "*excessive emphasis on the role of the state, ruling elites and traditional political actors and civil society actors to the detriment of social forms of unstructured mobilization and unstructuredness*" (Charrad et al., 2021).

Half of the case studies focus on what is called the mobilized public, that is, citizens who are active in various ways to influence the political process. Research first intersects in

discussions of how PREs are constrained by sustained social mobilization and the extent to which they engage from the bottom up, ignoring and suppressing or exploiting participation (Dixon, 2020).

Thus, should institutional arrangements such as new constitutions be viewed as an expression of a certain balance of power that has developed in the process of transformation? To understand the mechanism of their formation, one can “*focus on the strategic interaction of key players in the struggle for institutional innovation*” (Dahl, 2005). Again, they cross paths on the question of whether expanded population mobilization creates increased opportunities for participation and whether it contributes to the legitimacy and stability of the emerging political order, or creates instability and conflict (Andrey, 2011).

The main goal is to identify the key actors and understand the dynamics of the cycles of confrontation that have shaped these processes and led to a wide variety of tentative outcomes, ranging from state bankruptcy, civil war and de facto partition (Yemen and Libya) to authoritarian reconstruction (Egypt) and a shaky consensus on a more participatory and liberal order (Tunisia) (Christine et al., 2021; Muna, 2021; Diamond et al., 2014). For Tunisia and Egypt, the goal is also to determine the extent to which these preliminary results offer prospects for a sustainable balance between meaningful participation, good governance, and stability (Beinin, 2014).

Based on the above observations, we aimed to answer the following three problematic questions of this study:

1. Who are the critical actors in the transformation process?
2. How have the dynamics developed between critical stakeholders at the PRE level, the mobilized community and between these two levels?
3. What influence did these dynamics have on emerging political orders?

Accordingly, the research presented in this paper takes an actor-centered approach in analyzing the dynamics of political struggle and cooperation among the key players that drive the political struggle in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen.

This approach is based on the central assumption that the analytical focus is on the strategies, choices, and actions of those actors who have significant influence over the political process, referred to here as the politically significant elite (PRE) (Dodge, 2020). They can determine the key dynamics at work in the four cases discussed here.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

First, the following scientific methods were used in conducting this study: joint observation, semi-structured interviews, analysis of official documents and speeches (Droz-Vincent, 2020).

Second, the methodological basis of the study is a number of thematic scientific research. Thus, the study of the features of the “*Arab Spring*” in general and in some countries were: Abdelrahman (2013), Bayat, (2013), Alavi & Mohammed (2017), Burova & Korotaev (2012), Dodge (2020), Durac (2012), Grifa (2012), Raghavan (2011), Konstantin (2012), Völkel, (2017), Zherlitsyna (2016), Abu-Rabi (2003), Lücking (2021) & Ullmann (2021).

Dolgov (2020) studied the features of the socio-economic crisis in the Arab world during the Arab Spring and in the last period in 2018-2020.

Talk about the specifics of political transformations in the context of the "Arab Spring", we have a lot of respect for robots: Hoffmann et al. (2013), Holger & Schlumberger (2014), Mamedzade (2004) & Zakiyanov (2021).

Cammett et al. (2020) in work "*Insecurity and political values in the Arab world*" note that arab societies have been stuck in an autocratic paradox: Despite broad discontent, would-be reformers have been unable to build and sustain the broad social alliances that could bring about political change, and efforts to usher in political transitions are vulnerable to breakdown in the face of instability (Durac, 2012; Alavi & Mohammed, 2014). The political incentives created by these dynamics encourage manipulation on the part of incumbent rulers. Governments are tempted to mimic democratization in order to try to satisfy reformist elements of society (Habib & Najm, 2020).

Undoubtedly, we have analyzed studies on the political and structural transformations of the political elites of the Arab Spring (Valeria, 2005; Perthes, 2004).

Abhari (2020) notes that in those countries where the results of the "Arab spring" were not achieved and the military remained in power from the reaction, it is precisely the struggle with the internal "enemy" in the form of democratically minded strata of the population. At the same time, the military sees victory in the expulsion of this population, forcing them to migrate and leave the country (Hawthorne, 2004). The displacement of the Syrians, which can be observed in Turkey and the response of the Turkish government, all this testifies to the fact that the military junta and military elites do not cede power to the democratic forces, realizing that the consequences of their overthrow could lead to further persecution and persecution, up to international tribunals.

Such scientists as Ahmed & Capoccia (2014), Brumberg (2002), McFaul (2002) & Haynes (2020) explored the aspect of democratization in the Arab Spring.

It is important to note that the analysis of the specifics of the "Arab Spring" could not be without a scientific search for the achievements of civil society in the 2011 protests (Haynes, 2020). The work of scientists such as Beinini (2014), Challand (2013), Hawthorne (2004) & Charrad et al. (2021) on the role of civil society in the "Arab Spring" are also used in the preparation of this study (Miethlich & Šlahor, 2018).

Few scientists analyzed the impact of social networks on the transformation of Arab political elites (Arab Spring, 2011).

Studies of the army factor in the Arab Spring and Arab politics in general were carried out.

It is equally important to analyze the external factor that took place during the Arab Spring, in particular the factor of Turkey, which supported the protests (Migdal, 2001). This factor has been described.

Thirdly, this study, on the one hand, takes into account the interpretation of some scholars on the relationship of structural factors (such as economic conditions and education), the actions of political actors (eg, their ability to ideological consensus), their resources, and orientations always remain stable. and the whole process and the fact that the results are a function of the interaction of these factors (Yoko, 2019). At the same time, the authors of the study put forward their own conceptual alternative. Thus, the key idea of the study is that the events that have taken

place have occurred in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen since 2011 cannot be characterized as a linear, centrally conceived and managed transition from authoritarian orders to concrete outcomes. Suppose they are they view these developments as "*dynamic, ambivalent, and open processes of transformation*" representations, as well as norms and values that serve as means or political resources potentially influencing the trajectory of transformation (Yusuf, 2019). Thus, institutional mechanisms, such as new constitutions, should be seen as expressions of a certain balance of power developed in the process of transformation. To understand how they are created, it is proposed "*to focus on the strategic interaction of key players in the struggle for institutional innovation*".

Fourth, the aim of our research was to identify the dynamics of the confrontation between key players and to trace the trajectories that led to specific choices, alliances and elite configurations. In this regard, the most promising is the analysis of critical turning points in the transformation processes, since the calculations and priorities of the participants are likely to become most obvious at the moments when critical decisions can no longer be avoided, and priorities and alliances are overestimated (Nada & Goodman, 2011).

In the materials related to PRE were analyzed the negotiation processes of the authorities that followed the events of 2010-2011 in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, with an emphasis on the key actors who participated in the formal process of institutional change, as well as in the revision of the balance of the main forces.

We have presented the worldview of these actors, the strategies that they pursued, and the resources they have mobilized to achieve their goals (Della, 2013). We also analyzed their various alliances and confrontations in the process of political transformations.

In the presented study, when analyzing the dynamics of political struggle and cooperation between key players who are the driving forces of political struggle in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, we used a person-centered approach (Opp, 2009). That is, our work was based on the central assumption that analytical attention is paid to the strategies, choices and actions of those actors who have significant influence on the political process, here called the politically significant (relevant) elite. The developing relations between the representatives of the PRE were also assessed, which, in turn, can determine the key dynamics of the development of Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Tunisia.

About Politically Relevant Elites (PRE)

The actor-centered approach, naturally, requires identifying people and groups who play appropriate roles in the struggle and influence the process of state transformation. However, an analysis of nominal positions of power, such as the presidency, the leadership of the military and security forces, and the leadership of political parties, provides some information about the actors involved, but does not determine their relative weight (O'donnell et al., 2013). It also tends to disregard actors with significant influence who do not occupy nominal positions (for example, the business elite), especially as informal institutions and mechanisms are still critical in the analyzed political order (Raghavan, 2011).

Thus, a combination of positional, decision-based, reputational and network approaches used in elite research can help identify a wider range of relevant actors.

In an analysis of the changing power structures of Arab regimes in the early 2000s, Pertes and his colleagues coined the term politically significant (relevant) elite, defined as: “*people, groups ... in a given country who have political influence and power because they accept strategic decisions or participate in decision-making at the national level, contribute to the definition of political norms and values (including the definition of national interests) and directly influence the political discourse on strategic issues.*”

Accordingly, even in the explicitly authoritarian pre-insurrectionary order, political power is not necessarily confined to a narrowly defined core of the elite.

Around the president or the king and his immediate entourage, the model describes a significantly larger secondary elite, middle ranks of the ruling party, the officer corps, representatives of big business and government agencies, who influence the center and trades loyalty for shares of resources and local or sectorial powers (Ullmann, 2021).

The highest elite clerics, representatives of interest groups, prominent journalists may, from time to time or on certain issues of national importance, be able to set and influence agendas. In such an environment, the distribution of power may differ between actors at different stages and in different periods of the regime's manifestation, and the influence and bargaining power of individual actors is likely to increase or decrease in response to changes in the economic order, problems in the areas of security and foreign policy (Usataya et al., 2018). In addition, subjects in the secondary and tertiary elites often compete with each other for privileges from the center and control over resources and institutions that allow them to consolidate and expand their positions of power.

It often remains unclear to what extent the mainstream elite of an authoritarian regime actually controls, or rather relies on mediation between, participants who constitute semi-autonomous centers of power and can only be subdued at a significant cost. It is assumed that in four reviewed countries the displacement of the key decision-maker has provided entities at the second level of the PRE with much greater autonomy and control over power resources than they had before.

The opening up of the political sphere also allowed players previously excluded from the three elite circles or with rather limited access, as well as some completely new players to enter the political arena. These types of PREs perceived transformation processes as opportunities for establishing a new balance of power and establishing the rules of the game to ensure their dominant (or improved) position. Consequently, all involved participants tried to control as many resources as possible that they could mobilize in the struggle for dominance.

Forming coalitions among members of similar backgrounds and orientations was an obvious tool to achieve this goal. Subjects that have no direct influence on processes and decision-making cannot be classified as elite in the sociological sense. Occasionally, this active part of the population was included in alliances with PREs if they offered valuable resources that PREs would not have been able to access without them. For example, the approval by the Salafi party “*Nur*” of the coup in Egypt in July 2013 and the nomination of General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi gave the new political order a certain Islamic legitimacy.

The paper examines the transformation processes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen in the period from the beginning of 2011 to the present.

The main goal of the study is to identify the key participants and understand the dynamics of the cycles of confrontation aimed at the formation of processes of socio-political

transformations. The multidirectional transformations have produced a significant variety of preliminary results, ranging from state bankruptcy, civil war, and de facto partition (Yemen and Libya) to authoritarian reconstruction (Egypt) and a shaky consensus on wider participation and liberal order (Tunisia).

For Tunisia and Egypt, the aim is also to determine the extent to which these preliminary results offer the prospect of a sustainable balance between meaningful participation, good governance and stability.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Main Methodological Vector and Limitations of the Study

The key methodological vector of the study was the emphasis on the nature of political elites in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, after the "*Arab Spring*" and the accompanying political transformations. Among the factors of the latter, the author includes the commitment of the political elites of the Arab world to the ideas of counter-revolution (especially after the reduction of political and civic euphoria from the achievements of the Arab Spring), Islamic fundamentalism; practices of usurpation of power, discrediting the political opposition, leveling the political and economic rights of citizens and political populism.

It is important to note that this research, although it focuses on the specifics of the political changes and updates of the political elites of the Arab world as a result of the protests known to us as the Arab Spring, has a number of thematic and research limitations. To the latter the author includes:

The article does not analyze the array of data detailing the key transformations of the political elites of the Arab world from 2011 to 2021; The article does not stipulate the results of in-depth studies of the causal links of the transformation of the political elites of the Arab world after the "*Arab Spring*"; The article does not focus on the analysis of political careers, activities, relevance of political decisions of representatives of political elites (who gained or gained power as a result of the protests of the "*Arab Spring*") their compliance with constitutional and legal norms; The article does not analyze the current state and specifics of political communication of new political elites in the Arab Spring with civil society, political opposition and military command, which usually in the Arab world has a more or less significant influence on the political situation or are satellites of political elites who hold political power.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Main Features of the Formation and Formation of Political Elites in the Arab World

Analyzing the peculiarities of the formation of political elites in Arab countries, we must proceed from the following aspects of the influence of the external environment on this process.

1. Permanent opposition of the Arab culturological idea of the Christian, and the eastern way of life to the western, which was manifested in the antagonism to democratic ideas, opposing the democratic path to the development of the traditional eastern;

2. A high degree of dependence of the Arab countries on the EU and the Western world in financial and economic terms, the need to focus on global trends in the geopolitical balance in the regions of North Africa and the Middle East;
3. The influence exerted by the period of colonial expansion and the stay of the states of the Arab world under the yoke of colonial empires. Different empires had different influences on the development of the Arab countries, somewhere expanding the possibilities of self-government, somewhere directly penetrating the elite environment, somewhere imposing a Western image of government;
4. The dominance of the spiritual principle over the secular and the wide influence of spiritual leaders, who most often orthodoxly perceive the problems of confrontation between states professing different religions, and in addition, preaching the idea of the commonality of the Arab peoples and the need for them
5. Associations, which in many countries negatively affects national ideas and ideas of state building
6. Low standard of living and low economic potential, giving rise to problems of social security, lowering the level of well-being of the population. this leads to the escalation of social tension, the consequence of which, among other things, the events of the Arab Spring can be considered
7. High activity of the fundamental and radical currents of Islam, which advocate the aggressive expansion of the Islamic movement in Western countries, thereby increasing the level of aggression and negative perception of the European population towards the representatives of the Arab world, and Christians towards the representatives of Islam.

According to P. Mammadzadeh, a characteristic feature of the political elite of the Arab East at the end of XX beginning of XXI century. is the task of strengthening the existing system of power and transferring it either by inheritance or according to the principles of "*managed democracy*", when election results are often easily predictable, and most importantly, are of secondary importance, since they will not lead to a significant change in the political course in the country. In conditions of the instability of the political system, the role of a stabilizing factor is played by the army and special services. In a number of countries, they serve as a solid support of the political elite, and in some cases they themselves constitute it.

For example, in Tunisia and Egypt, the military did not support the regime, which contributed to the rapid victory of the protesters. In Libya and Yemen, a fragmented weak army could not play a decisive role in determining the outcome of the confrontation. In Bahrain, law enforcement officials shared the status of a religious minority with the ruling elite, providing the regime with guaranteed support. In Syria, denominational ties and the privileged position of the officer "*class*," regardless of social background, have led to a similar outcome.

The key element of the political system in the Arab East is also the weighty role of the head of state, who concentrates in his hands the reins of government, both in domestic political affairs and in the international arena. In countries with a republican form of government, during a change of power, it often goes either to the children of the deceased head of state, or to a representative of the ruling clan. This gives reason for liberal-minded circles in the West to talk about the very insignificant role of elections as a democratic institution in the political life of the country. And, consequently, the inability of citizens to influence their destiny through voting.

It is also important to point out that the new political elites of the Arab countries preferentially used paternalistic-client (vertical) relations between the political leadership and the rest of the elite. Rarely when the elite really relied on and strengthened their positions at the expense of multidirectional political parties, which gave the necessary dispersion in accepting the socio-economic and socio-political realities of the further development of statehood after gaining independence. This led to the gradual displacement of the bearers of the most important

qualities for their time by new political figures, more than the previous ones, meeting modern requirements.

Civil society plays an important role in the formation of political elites in Arab countries. It is it that is designed to become the main element of social and political control, which is based on the integration of political pluralism, democratic ideas into the content of theses proclaimed by the ruling political elites of the Arab countries.

The colonial era was a turning point in the development of civil society in the Arab world, introducing modern forms of association. At the time, the region was dominated by community-based self-help groups, artels, traders, religious charities and educational institutions (funded by Islamic foundations), while peasants and family clans set the tone in rural areas. The European invasion gave birth to secular and political institutions, such as professional associations, labor unions, cultural and sports clubs - ironically, precisely those groups and political parties that motivated the local population in favor of independence.

After independence, civil society fell into the hands of new nationalist and reformist regimes. In particular, in countries ruled by strong state-socialist and populist regimes, civic associations were either lured, becoming an instrument of the state (such as trade unions), or banned - the case of the Palestinian territories, when oppression came from Israel. It should be noted here that we do not share the point of view of E. Hawthorne and S., considering that civil society as a social or socio-political phenomenon is an objective phenomenon, an objectively existing component of any modern society, since the ideas of democracy cannot be artificially limited (Ye, 2016). They can be prohibited, but their limitation in the doctrine of public perception of reality is impossible. Therefore, democratic values undoubtedly affect the formation of individual legal awareness and moral and ethical perception of those socio-political processes that are taking place in Arab countries.

But speaking of such a society precisely as a phenomenon, we must understand that it always develops only based on the ideas of democracy, but its basis is national cultural self-identification, without which it is impossible to realize the civilizational values of a particular society. This suggests that his ideals must fit into the general framework of the cultural and national context of the development of the Arab world and Arab nationalism.

In general, in the question of the origin of the Arab elites, the processes of their formation were homogeneous for the whole Arab world, and one of the factors influencing them was the attitude to religion: on the one hand, the actualization of religion, on the other-the course of secular states. According to researcher Verbytska, raising the level of education of the population (for example in Egypt) in other Arab countries was one of the most important factors that influenced the change in the composition of the elite. If earlier the laws of the constitutional development of Arab countries depended on the nature of their social orientation, nowadays most of these states in their constitutions declare adherence to the general principles and norms of human rights protection, the UN Charter, and other international organizations. In the new constitutions, there is a tendency to increase them and complicate the internal structure, the emergence of entire chapters or sections on the rights, freedoms, and responsibilities of citizens.

At the same time, the practice of Arab countries shows that modern elites are actively using constitutional provisions to strengthen their positions of power and create mechanisms for the stability of power.

The factors influencing the formation and transformation of political regimes in the Arab countries have attracted the closest attention of researchers in recent years both for the depth and scale of their manifestations. The demonstrations that began in 2011 and were directed against the current regimes, which received the general name "*Arab Spring*", affected almost all countries of the Arab world (the only exception was Somalia, Djibouti and Comoros).

The events of the Arab revolutions of 2011 can be characterized as in a certain sense a unique phenomenon, although it should be noted that similar processes were observed in the 60s of the twentieth century, during the anti-colonial struggle of the peoples of Africa, as well as at the turn of the 80s and 90s. XX century in the process of the collapse of the socialist bloc - the so-called "*spring of peoples*". Events in the Middle East and North Africa, originating in 2011, and today arouse the considerable interest of specialists in various fields of knowledge and, above all, political scientists, as they continue to influence the existing system of international relations and local processes of the formation of the political elite in the region.

This interest is primarily due to the fact that most Arab countries are at the stage of formation or formation of their own statehood, despite the fact that nominal independence, sovereignty, and even constitutional processes were acquired and started in the middle of the last century. Nevertheless, the crisis of the political elites of most Arab countries has led to the fact that today the republican form of government does not justify itself from the point of view of the modern stage of development of Arab statehood, national idea, and political configuration in Arab countries. Most republican forms of government are experiencing or have survived a crisis, which was one of the reasons for the Arab Spring.

It is worth noting that the catalysts for uprisings in all countries of the Arab world were of a common nature and included: excessive authoritarianism of the authorities, bordering on arbitrariness; corruption that has penetrated all spheres of public relations; powerlessness or constant restriction of opportunities for the population to exercise their political and other rights; concentration of wealth in the hands of power. All of these factors were supposed to be overcome by changing the model of the socio-political structure, taking into account Islamic values and worldview. However, it is much more relevant to conclude that the reasons for the "*Arab Spring*" nominally lie not in the formation of democracy, but in the context of solving such socially significant problems as high unemployment and corruption. Summarizing the results of the study, it is advisable to present their nominal outcome in Table 1, information that will provide an opportunity for discussion in assessing the role of the military-political and non-military democratic elites in the process of the "*Arab Spring*" (Table 1).

<p style="text-align: center;">Table 1 THE NATURE OF THE COURSE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE "ARAB SPRING" IN THE COUNTRIES WHERE THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ELITES HAS BEEN MOST ACUTE</p>					
Country	Protest period	Characteristics of the political regime and elite before the protests	Reasons for protests	Characteristics of the political regime and the ruling elite after the protests	Consequences of protests

Tunisia	December 17, 2010 - January 14, 2011	Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali - President of Tunisia in the period 1987-2011, a representative of the military-political elite. The country was ruled by the military	Corruption, unemployment, social inequality, repression.	After the overthrow of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia was temporarily headed by Mohammed Ghannushi, and later Fuad Mebaza, which can be attributed to the transitional stage.	There was a process of transferring power from the military-political elite to the democratic forces headed by Monsef Marzouki. The goals of freeing political prisoners and democratizing political processes were also achieved. Formally considered the beginning of the "Arab Spring"
Libya	January 13, 2011 - October 20, 2011	Muammar Gaddafi is the military ruler of Libya who has held power for over 40 years.	Authoritarianism, corruption, social and political inequality	The coming to power of democratic forces, but at the present stage, the dualism of the rule of F. Saraj (democratic government recognized by the international community) and H. Haftar (representative of the military junta of revanchists)	Murder of Muammar Gaddafi, transfer of power to the Transitional National Council, civil war 2011-2019 between military junta and democratic government
Yemen	January 18, 2011 - February 25, 2012	Saleh, Ali Abdallah, representative of the military-political elite. The country was ruled by the military	Government disagreement with the president's policies	Hadi, Abd-Rabbu Mansour, a representative of the military-political elite, but he is reforming political institutions and the army on a democratic basis	Civil war and humanitarian disaster in Yemen, as well as ongoing conflicts with pirates in the Strait of Aden and al-Qaeda, supported by Iran
Egypt	January 25, 2011 - February 11, 2011	Hosni Mubarak, representative of the military-political elite. The country was ruled by the military	Suppression of opposition, growth of poverty, youth unemployment, structural and demographic factors	Change of government (January 29, 2011) and the coming to power of the military led by Mohammed Hussein Tantawi Suleiman. June 30, 2012 - July 3, 2013 reign of M. Morsi - a democratic-oriented president, overthrown as a result of the military coup by A. Al-Sisi, who has ruled since 2014	The first stage: holding free elections, solving the problems of poverty and unemployment; the assumption of power by the Supreme Soviet of the Armed Forces; Second stage: Suspension of the Constitution, dissolution of parliament; The collapse of the NDP, the former ruling party in Egypt, and the transfer of its assets to the state; Democratic candidate Mohammed Morsi as president; The third stage: revenge of the military led by A. al-Sisi

Important Highlights of the Transformation Process Among the Political Elites of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen after the Arab Spring

Almost four years after the substantial processes of transformation (Arab Spring), the countries we are considering have undergone significant changes in the composition of actors involved in political decision-making and agenda setting, as well as in the relations between them. The scale of these changes encompasses the massive elimination of major PREs (as in Libya) prior to the arrival of major new players and the dramatic successes of previously marginalized or banned groups in the political process (as in Tunisia and Egypt).

In Yemen, a power-sharing agreement between different segments of the old PRE and the traditional opposition initially provided some continuity, but in the fall of 2014, Ansarullah (the Houthi movement) relied on the force of arms to displace parts of the established PRE and sought agreements with others, including the former president. So, parties and entities that advocate variants of political Islam initially achieved significant popular support in competitive elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and therefore solid representation in transitional governments and constituent assemblies.

Al-Jabali stated that the revolutions in the Arab world were popular and similar in their demands. He affirmed that these uprisings emerged after a long struggle waged by political parties and unions, saying, "*This revolution belongs to the Tunisian people, and no one can speak for it, because the very theme of the revolution was dignity, social justice and equality in rights*".

The power-sharing agreement in Yemen also gave a vote in the government of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah party. Thus, these Islamist groups were in a good position to have a significant impact on the subsequent transformation processes. At the same time, a significant number of participants who were associated with the old regimes as beneficiaries or in an official capacity were able to maintain or regain significant positions in the PRE.

The most obvious example is Egypt, where the leadership that emerged from the 2013 coup reinstated a number of prominent Mubarak-era leaders, pursuing a new deal with the authoritarian elite under the vanguard of the military. Tunisia succeeded in providing a platform that revived the central tenets of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali's rule, in particular state-imposed secularism, while at the same time distancing itself from regime abuses and, unlike Egypt, allowing the continued engagement of the forces of political Islam.

Even in Libya, the restructuring of political alliances is increasingly facilitating the return of some prominent figures of the Gaddafi regime to parts of the country. Although the road map for Yemen clearly sidelined President Ali Abdullah Saleh then, it preserved the role of his political camp and allowed his family to maintain influence and power, especially in the armed forces.

With the partial exception of Yemen, the return to power or the maintenance of influential segments of the elite in such positions didn't occur as a result of a pre-conceived strategy devised by remnants and supporters of the old regime to suppress the uprisings of 2011.

Rather, the intense polarization that ensued when newcomers to the PRE tried to turn its obvious leverage into real influence and control, thereby, provoking the creation of heterogeneous political alliances against itself. For these initially defensive coalitions, the support of major groups of former public sector employees, including but not limited to the

security sector, as well as the business community, has been an extremely valuable political resource. For reasons of self-interest (fear of position and privilege), social prejudice (against newcomers with different behavioral and cultural codes), or ideological antagonism, these groups remained largely hostile towards newcomers to the PRE.

Political players, who could plausibly identify with the positive aspects of the old order, without being too blatantly tarnished by its abuses, were attractive to these groups. Moreover, their position in the emerging political landscape received an additional impetus, as the population began to grow tired of protracted and chaotic processes that did not bring them tangible benefits.

In terms of the shifting balance of power, political resources were clearly more important than the procedural framework for change. Thus, in the four cases analyzed here, institutional constructs were largely the result of power politics, rather than shaping those outcomes, as suggested in the literature on constitutional and institutional “*engineering*” and, as expected, from external actors promoting democratization.

It can also be noted that formal transformation processes, such as drafting new constitutions, are not necessarily incompatible with, or exclude, political violence. Actual violence, together with explicit and implicit threats and fueling fears of impending violence, has been used by a variety of political actors as a manipulative political resource to gain leverage. Instead of leading to the collapse of transformation processes, such high-risk strategies changed the dynamics, sometimes in a paradoxical way.

In Egypt, the 2013 military coup initiated what could be described as a reset of the formal transformation process. This paved the way for an authoritarian recovery. In Libya, the official transformation process continued for a significant period of time to coincide with widespread violence escalating into civil war.

Political violence unblocked the blocked constitutional process in Tunisia, as the threat of escalation forced the parties to compromise. In Yemen, Ansarullah forcibly invaded the capital and took over government offices, but initially remained committed to the terms of the GCC Initiative, at least on a rhetorical level, seeking to correct what he saw as fatal flaws in its implementation.

The perceived influence of external actors on the dynamics of internal power has taken on significant importance in internal discourses and has contributed to heightening suspicions about hidden programs and resources. In fact, the power struggle was primarily driven by domestic players who asked for and accepted foreign support to advance their own interests and goals. First of all, these external actors were ultimately unable to steer the process in a direction consistent with their goals.

Even in Yemen, where socio-political changes have been implemented most consistently, where dependence on external assistance and the real threat of international sanctions gave domestic forces significant leverage, the results were not predetermined. It can be noted that although the provision of external resources to internal, clearly confrontational, players definitely contributed to a sharp deterioration in the security situation in Libya and the 2013 coup in Egypt, local driving forces were the driving force behind the development of such scenarios. It cannot be argued that the “*tyranny of initial conditions*” links the outcome of “*non-cooperation processes*” with the distribution of political resources on a linear basis. Resources do matter, but

they are not major assets, and their efficiency depends on how and by whom they are used and at what point within the broader dynamics of contention.

Repressive tactics, including deadly violence directed at opponents, undermined the credibility of the Egyptian military's elites in late 2011, but restored their claims to leadership in 2013. Street mobilization became an asset for Ennahda in Tunisia in 2011, but later proved to be a problem. The electoral success gave momentum to Libyan players in 2012, but in 2014 it prevented the winners from forming a government with national reach. Outside support allowed Yemen's new president to cut some of the deep-rooted networks of the Saleh faction in the early stages of the transformation, but did not help counter the Ansarullah offensive in mid-2014.

Despite the attention paid to the ideological conflict, in particular, regarding the role of political Islam in Tunisia and Egypt, 13 ideological positions were equally insufficient to predict behavior, form alliances and the course of transformations.

In Egypt, following the coup in July 2013, many self-proclaimed liberals did not hesitate to cooperate with the Nur party (much more ideologically rigid and socially conservative than the Muslim Brotherhood) and approve of arbitrary arrests and unlawful killings.

In early 2014, in Tunisia, the Islamist party Ennahda approved a constitution that was widely praised for its liberal content, and discovered enough in common with its alleged ideological nemesis, Nida Tunes, to consider the question of separation of authority.

In Libya and Yemen, where the relationship between religion and politics seemed much less contradictory among most of the actors at the beginning of the transformation, sectarian and ideological divisions arose from power politics and were exploited in a clearly instrumental way. In Libya, power struggles between emerging political blocs are increasingly seen as part of a region-wide struggle between supporters and opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Yemen, the initial empowerment of the Islah party, followed by the rise of Ansarullah, prompted supporters and opponents of the respective groups to embrace an increasingly sectarian discourse. It is tempting to describe such ideological inconsistencies and adaptations as a manifestation of opportunism and cynical power politics on the part of the players involved, but as an alternative they may actually assume that the interactions experienced transform the participants in change. As noted, some of the political blocs that began to shape policy after the uprising rallied around an ideological platform only in response to specific threats and opportunities arising from the transformation process.

Even the groups that entered the process as apparently related entities have been profoundly affected. Thus, Ennahda's trajectory can be described as the evolution of an anti-systemic movement with social revolutionary aspects into a conservative state party. Even before the ruthless crackdown on Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood that began in July 2013, massive desertions and the rise of Salafi parties challenged claims of ideological hegemony. Indeed, the tactical alliances within the PRE have become a decisive factor influencing the trajectories of transformation, but they are also the products of similar trajectories.

Alliances formed in response to a particular balance of power and competitive dynamics may have the potential to consolidate in strategic networks and become key components of new or rebuilt elite deals.

In Egypt and Tunisia, there were clear signs of the formation of strong coalitions around the priority of restoring state power and facing challenges to the existing social order, including networks of privilege that flourished in the shadow of the anciens régimes. However, it remains

doubtful that new deals by the elite in Tunisia and Egypt will lead to the establishment of a stable and legal order. Technocratic rule in Egypt, reinforced by a large dose of authoritarianism, may generate some legitimacy and hence support among a population weary of turmoil and dysfunctional governance.

However, the reproduction in Egypt of alliances between privileged business and the military (with a much more prominent role than before 2011) and the restoration of privilege networks linking the political, business and administrative sectors in Tunisia are unlikely to bring legitimacy and therefore stability in the medium and long term (Vallianatos, 2013). Associated with justifying common interests, such coalitions are inherently incapable of eradicating clientelist networks. At the same time, both in Egypt and in Tunisia, there was a clear tendency (albeit to very different degrees) to limit the opportunities for informal participation and controversial action.

An anti-militia popular movement emerged in Libya when the political process stalled and the central government's inability to control much of the country allowed a mobilized public to organize at the local level and make demands on marginalized groups and territories, and the trend is also observed in Yemen (Trager, 2016).

However, when they stepped into the void, a large part of this mobilized public took on a partisan character, as a result of which it disintegrated or split. Those who chose to ally with the PRE quickly lost their autonomy, particularly when the rise in violence fostered discourses demanding unconditional loyalty to those allegedly leading the fight against existential threats. They may still have been able to reach a social milieu inaccessible to formal parties and thus provide a valuable service for which they could demand returns, but their ability and even will to challenge political leadership has all but disappeared. Those who refused to side with and continued to challenge the EWP were often isolated or even criticized by the public supporting the PRE's antagonistic protagonists.

On the contrary, political movements, including the «Muslim Brotherhood» in Egypt, the Nidaa Tounes (during the autumn 2013 protests) and even the militant Ansarullah in Yemen (in 2014), have integrated into their repertoire of political struggle popular mobilizations simulating exterior view on the 2011 Uprising. In addition, since such actors did not fully control their supporters, there was a danger that cycles of mobilization and countermobilization could lead to political violence and civil unrest, providing a pretext for brutal repression, as happened in Egypt in 2013 and elsewhere, such as, in Bahrain in 2011.

Undoubtedly, P. Bovsunivsky, is right in his opinion, noting that today most Arab countries are experiencing a transitional stage of development. After the overthrow of dictatorial regimes as a result of the "*Arab Spring*", moderate Islamists came to power in most republics, who were outlawed before the uprisings and could not claim supremacy. In monarchies, clerical forces acted as a brake on social development, imposing established stereotypes on sovereigns. The only exception is Morocco, where street protests instigated by Islamists have led to political reform "*from above*". The complexity of the situation lies in the growing influence of Islamic radical movements, which in the context of the constitutional process require their more moderate colleagues in power to adopt new constitutions that essentially call into question the secularism of state power and may transform the balance of power in Arabic. and the Islamic worlds.

Yemen

According to the 1991 Constitution, an elected President, 301 elected assemblies of representatives, and an appointed 111-member Shura Council share power. The president is the head of state and the prime minister is the head of government. In Sana'a, the government is formed by the Supreme Political Council (not internationally recognized).

The presidential election in Yemen is unique. After the uprising in Yemen, the Gulf states took the initiative with Aki Abdullah Saleh to sign an agreement on the resignation from his post and the transfer of powers to Vice-President Abdurabo Mansour Hadi. On November 23, 2011, Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the contract. On November 26, 2011, Abdurabo Mansour Hadi announced presidential elections in Yemen. As a result of the election, 99.99% went to the side of Abdurabo Mansour Hadi. Yemen faced a number of problematic issues. There was inter-tribal (inter-religious) conflict; also, between the south and the north of Yemen; the interference of foreign countries was evident. Some will argue that these factors existed elsewhere, but the situation was still different.

Historically, Yemenis are divided into Zaidis, Shafais, Ismailis, and Jewish minorities. Each has supporters from certain tribes. Accordingly, the problem in Yemen is tribal rather than sectarian. Most of the time religious tolerance prevailed in Yemen, especially between the Zaidis and the Shafi. The Zaydis ruled Yemen from 892 to 1962 (1070 years). The Sunnis had a view that they were regarded as second-rate, while the Zaydite tribes (especially the Sadah), belonging to the house of the Prophet Muhammad, dominated economically, with no formulated plans for sustainable development. The Zaidites believe that the Imamate (Caliphate) should belong to the descendants of Al Hasan and Al Hussan, the sons of Ali bin Abi Taleb. This is a kind of tribal political Islam that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt seeks. In 1990, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the north and south of Yemen were united. And in 1992, with the permission of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the party "*Ansar Allah al-Houthi*" was established to receive financial support from Saudi Arabia. The Salafist group of Imam Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi also received support. This proves that Saleh used sectarian groups to divide and rule. Saleh allowed Al Qidah, the Houthis and the Muslim Brotherhood to blackmail Saudi Arabia and the United States, threatening Saudi Arabia's tranquility.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh became the first elected president of unified Yemen in 1999 (although he had been president of unified Yemen since 1990 and president of North Yemen since 1978). He was re-elected to the post in September 2006. Saleh's victory was marked by an election that international observers deemed "*partly free*," although the election was marked by violence, violations of press freedom, and allegations of fraud. Parliamentary elections were held in April 2003, and the General People's Congress maintained an absolute majority. Saleh remained almost unchallenged in his seat of power until 2011, when local frustration with his refusal to hold another round of elections, combined with the impact of the Arab Spring in 2011, led to mass protests. He was forced to resign in 2012, although he remained an important player in Yemeni politics, having made an alliance with the Husis during their rise to power in the mid-2010.

Libya

The Libyan revolution began on February 17, 2011. The National Transitional Council took over on March 5, 2011 by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and afterwards Abdurrahim Abdulhafiz El-Keib was elected president. Elections in July 2012 showed that the Muslim Brotherhood won 21% of the seats, while the Alliance of National Forces won 49%. Libya is characterized by high religiosity, even the National Forces Alliance is considered a moderate religious party. It should be noted that Gadhafi had his own particular interpretation of Islam, which does not affect the religious ideology of Libyans as much. "*The Arab Spring*" in Libya brought political and tribal crises, and the role of political Islam in Libya is not idealized. After the 2012 elections, Freedom House upgraded Libya from unfree to partly free and now consider the country an electoral democracy. The Libyan revolution began on February 17, 2011. The National Transitional Council took over on March 5, 2011 by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and afterwards Abdurrahim Abdulhafiz El-Keib was elected president. Elections in July 2012 showed that the Muslim Brotherhood won 21% of the seats, while the Alliance of National Forces won 49%. Libya is characterized by high religiosity; even the National Forces Alliance is considered a moderate religious party. It should be noted that Gadhafi had his own particular interpretation of Islam, which does not affect the religious ideology of Libyans as much. "*The Arab Spring*" in Libya brought political and tribal crises, and the role of political Islam in Libya is not idealized. After the 2012 elections, Freedom House upgraded Libya from unfree to partly free and now consider the country an electoral democracy.

Gaddafi merged the civil and Sharia courts in 1973. The civil courts now employ Sharia judges who sit in the regular appellate courts and specialize in Sharia appeal cases. The laws concerning personal status are taken from Islamic law.

At a meeting of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee on December 2, 2014, UN Special Representative Bernardino Leon characterized Libya as non-state.

Today we see Libya as a parliamentary republic with a legislative body, the unicameral House of Representatives, which meet in Tobruk. The former legislative body was the General National Congress with 200 seats. The General National Congress (2014), a largely unrecognized rival parliament based in the de jure capital Tripoli, claims to be a legitimate extension of the INC.

On July 7, 2012, Libyans voted in parliamentary elections, the first free elections in nearly 40 years. About thirty women were elected as members of parliament. The first results of the vote showed that the Alliance of National Forces, led by former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, was the leader. The Justice and Construction Party, part of the Muslim Brotherhood, fared worse than similar parties in Egypt and Tunisia. It won 17 of the 80 seats contested by the parties, but about 60 independent candidates have since joined its closed caucus.

On March 30, 2014, the General National Congress voted to replace itself with a new House of Representatives (Rizzi & Nishio, 2019). The new legislature allocates 30 seats to women, will have a total of 200 seats (with individuals who can run as members of political parties), and allows Libyan foreign nationals to run for office.

The agreement to form a unified provisional government was signed on December 17, 2015. Under the terms of the agreement, a nine-member Presidential Council and a seventeen-member interim government of national harmony will be formed with the goal of holding new

elections within two years. The House of Representatives will continue to exist as a legislative body, while the advisory body, known as the Council of State, will be formed from members appointed by the General National Congress (2014).

The formation of an interim unity government was announced on February 5, 2021, after its members were elected by the Libya Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) (Shlykov & Patel, 2019). Seventy-four members of the LPDF voted for four members to hold office, including the prime minister and the head of the presidential council. After none of the lists reached the 60 percent voting threshold, the two leading teams competed in a second round of elections. Mohamed Younes Menif, former ambassador to Greece, would become head of the presidential council (Yurtsever & Abdulkarim; 2018). Meanwhile, Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeiba, a businessman, will become interim prime minister. All of the candidates running in this election, including members of the winning list, have pledged to appoint women to 30% of all leadership positions in the government. None of the politicians elected to head the interim government will be allowed to run in national elections scheduled for December 24, 2021.

The new prime minister will have 21 days to form a cabinet, which must be approved by the various governing bodies in Libya. Once this cabinet is agreed upon, the unity government will replace all "*parallel authorities*" in Libya, including the National Accord Government in Tripoli and the administration headed by General Haftar.

Tunisia

The only successful Arab country that was able to balance secularism and political Islam. The Islamic Party (al-Nahda) suffered persecution and oppression during the Ben Ali regime. In the 1989 elections, most al-Nahda leaders left Tunisia because, according to bin Ali, they considered secularism a threat.

On October 23, 2011, al-Nahda won political supremacy with 41.47% of the vote (89 seats out of 217 in the National Assembly). An interim (coalition) government was established and Al Marzouki was elected president (Republic Party Congress) with Al Jebali as prime minister (Al Nahda Party) and Mustafa Ben Jaafar as president of the Constituent Assembly. This illustrated the intentions of building a consensus government. But when the Constituent Assembly elections came, many of Tunisia's secularists feared Islamist domination of power, although the role of the Islamists was, in some ways, secondary at the beginning of the uprisings because of the suppression of the previous regime.

The Islamic opposition in Tunisia was the only real opposition that fought against Zionism and American policies, which gave them an important symbolism that increased their popularity among the people and made them think they were the only strong and substantial opposition in Tunisia. Non-Islamists cannot boast of such an influence on the crowd. The popularity of the Islamists in Tunisia stems from their social role in providing social services to the population of their main / middle class. To this end, a charitable organization was established, including with funds from the Persian Gulf. The Islamists presented a strong religious discourse that presented a solution to many of the problems of members of the Tunisian community.

Most Western media categorize Al Nahda as a moderate Islamist. In particular, O. Kessler states that al-Nahda uses Western influence as a tool to Islamize the country. He believes that al-Nahda's cooperation with secularists is a long-term strategy of Islamism.

On November 13, 2011, Hamadi Jebali received a high-ranking Hamas official and said: *"My brothers, you are at a historic moment ... in a new cycle of civilization, God willing ... we are in the sixth caliphate, God willing"*.

This statement drew the ire of some Tunisian secularists. It could prove that Western and Islamic identities are incompatible if the caliphate system were on the table in Tunisia. This statement has led some experts to cynically restrain Al Nahda. On the other hand, Al Nahda has also been criticized by Salafists. O. Kessler accuses Al Nahda of appeasing both secularists and Salafists. In the past Salafis have played a role in the deteriorating security situation in Tunisia. On Oct. 30, 2012, two Salafists were killed after attacking a National Guard center with Molotov cocktails and knives. The most dangerous attacks, however, were on the U.S. embassy in September 2012, which led to disagreements with the Islamic government and secular opposition over how to deal with radical Islamists. Al Qaeda leader. Ayman al-Zawahri called on Tunisians to overthrow the al-Nahda government and said, *"They are inventing an 'Islam' that the U.S. State Department, the European Union and Gulf scholars like. Such 'Islam' permits gambling clubs, nudist beaches, usury banks, and secular laws"*. According to sociology, 48% of Tunisians want a religious state and 44% prefer a secular state; about a quarter have sympathy for both regimes.

Today, Tunisia is experiencing a loss of democratic gains as a result of the Arab Spring. According to political commentator Vitaly, (2021) the decision of the current President of Tunisia Kais Said to concentrate all power in his hands, dismissing the government, suspending the work of parliament, and depriving deputies of immunity shows the regularity of events in countries that after a successful fight against authoritarianism effective democracies. The expert predicts that if President Said manages to establish an authoritarian regime in Tunisia based on bayonets and popular enthusiasm, it will only mean that the second *"Jasmine Revolution"* ended in the same way as the first - authoritarianism with a delayed result.

For his part, Omair Enas, a professor of international relations at Yildirim Beyazit University in Ankara, believes that although Kais Said is usurping power, he will not become an independent politician. According to the Turkish analyst, the Tunisian president *"does not have the charisma of dictators in Africa, does not have the strong support of the army and the base of supporters"* (Konstantin, 2012). Therefore, he is likely to become a weak leader and will be forced to play the flute of external manipulators.

Egypt

In the 1990s and 2000s, the Muslim Brotherhood was, in fact, a dynastic opposition movement, appealing to human rights and rhetoric against corruption as well as democratic appeals. However, after the Arab Spring in June 2011, new rival Islamists representing the Salafi school of thought named the party Al-Nour. In all, there were 29 parties in 2011-2012, and independent candidates competed for 498 seats in the People's Assembly elections. The Islamists (Al-Nour + Muslim Brotherhood) won 68% of the seats in the Assembly (Vallianatos, 2013). The

regular Shura Council elections were held from January 29, 2012 to February 22, 2012. The Islamists won 83% of the seats.

In May 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi won the presidential election (51.7% of the vote), competing against the old regime candidate, Ahmad Shafiq. Official figures showed a turnout of 25,578,233, or 47.5%, with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi receiving 23.78 million votes, or 96.9%, compared to 757,511 (3.1%) for Hamdeen Sabahi.

A sociology published in August 2011 showed that 44% of Egyptians favored the formation of an Islamic state. Only 10% of citizens claimed to be in favor of a strong state, even if it is undemocratic.

After a wave of public discontent with the autocratic arbitrariness of the Muslim Brotherhood government under President Mohamed Morsi, on July 3, 2013, then-General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced the removal of Morsi from office and the suspension of the constitution. A 50-member constitutional committee was formed to amend the constitution, which was later published for a public vote and on January 18, 2014 (Zakiyanov, 2021). At the time, A. Ali and K. Elkadi stated, "*The Muslim Brotherhood used its legislative and presidential powers to dominate the political arena, whereas, as we mentioned above, Egyptian secular parties are fragmented and lack human capital and organizational resources*". According to Al Rashedi, Al Sisi seized this opportunity from the beginning of the Egyptian revolution to pretend to be part of the Muslim Brotherhood and to adopt their thinking and principles (Zherlitsyna, 2016). "*The Muslim Brotherhood trusted him, which led to the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt*".

Today Egypt is a presidential-parliamentary republic. The House of Representatives is elected for a five-year term, according to the law. In 2013, Freedom House rated political rights in Egypt at 5 (1 being the freest and 7 being the lowest) and civil liberties at 5, giving it a "*partly free*" freedom rating.

Some researchers of the problems of the development of the modern Arab world have proposed interpretations of modifications of the state system, linking structural factors (such as economic conditions and educational level) and the actions of political actors (for example, their ability to ideological consensus). But at the same time, the basis was the stability of the resources and orientation of the subjects throughout the entire transformation process, and the results implied the function of the interaction of these factors. The data presented by us indicate that the events that have occurred in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen since 2011 cannot be characterized as a linear, centrally thought-out and controlled transition from authoritarian orders to specific socio-political changes. Rather, these events should be viewed as "*dynamic, ambivalent and open processes of transformation*" representations, as well as norms and values that serve as a means or political resource potentially influencing the trajectory of transformation (Völkel, 2017). Therefore, we do not intend to measure dynamics against benchmarks of institutional transformation, and we do not seek to identify causal relationships between structural factors and preliminary results. We viewed legacy and structural conditions as just another set of political resources or as part of the "*good or bad hand*" to be played in the political struggle for new institutions.

CONCLUSION

The impetus of the 2011 uprisings, instead of becoming a political force for change, was appropriated by old and new members of the PRE, who increasingly embraced new forms and instruments of mobilization and thus abolished forms of political expression with the potential for participation and liberation.

Groups of activists remain in the studied states who continue to develop their skills and preserve the social memory of resistance. It is possible that they will eventually become part of an evolutionary build-up of effective repertoires of activism and leadership that pose a greater challenge to the EWP in the next cycles of strife.

However, a more inevitable result of frustrated expectations, fruitless engagement and deteriorating living conditions may be that large sections of society will turn the lost hope of 2011 into a rejection of any participation in public life or into support of populist, chauvinist or radical tendencies.

Despite its repressive and undemocratic tendencies, the consocial division of power has certain pragmatism at the political level and realism at the theoretical level, since it recognizes the geopolitical and international forces that determine the conditions and parameters of elite struggle. However, can scholars legally continue to believe that what hundreds of thousands of people are protesting against, for example, in Iraq and Lebanon, is necessary? This, at any rate, deserves a bold leap in consociative theorizing.

The subjects of the consociative settlements in the Arab world have expressed their frustration with a system that privileges elites across the slice of society - and their external patrons - through genuine participation and social justice. The promise of inclusion, equitable distribution and access to resources for all segments of the population has led to significant inequalities between access that sectarian elites have and that of individuals in those sects that the consocial agreement promises to include.

Instead, there remains a hegemony that perpetuates the collective beliefs of sectarian inclusion, where material reality is the reality of class-based exclusion. To overcome this, it is proposed to take a closer look at the many forms of inequality that generate and bind together the relationship between state and society.

Indeed, both Lebanon and Iraq are currently witnessing revolutionary attempts, albeit so far ineffective. Their goal is to denormalize interfaith opposition, gender inequality and economic isolation. While these struggles are largely dispersed and uncoordinated, they represent bottlenecks where the consociative system is exposed and threatened.

The concept of counter-revolution offers a way to steer academic and political debate away from the overriding importance of state stability, which is deeply rooted in liberal political thought, and more seriously tackle the empirical urgency of millions of people.

Consocial actors in the Arab world, some of whom risk their lives to counter its prohibitive order and promote their democratic, inclusive and, in some cases, intersecting demands. Alas, these brave protesters are at a historical disadvantage precisely because counter-revolution is so deeply rooted in their respective states. As new democratic rivals emerge (and reappear), counter-revolution has had the luxury of time and history to consolidate its interest groups, create regional and international networks, and accumulate resources to proactively

defend its position long period. This counterrevolutionary position, manifested in the preservation of "zombie" states, extends beyond state borders.

Meanwhile, the so-called participants in power - supposedly defenders and representatives of genuine sectarian communities - have established economic partnerships and political alliances around the world. Both materially and culturally, they have more in common with each other and with the international business elite than with their respective local communities.

This class awareness and conceptualization of counter-revolution that I have outlined here is intended to inspire a bold leap in the study of power sharing in the Arab world. For how can we pretend that power is distributed when, over time and with the help of counter-revolutionary mechanisms, the dividing power has become a consolidated class that strengthens its privileged position against a pluralistic society, deprived of all its political possibilities?

In conclusion, it should be noted that in the context of the innovative development of the region, the human factor, namely human capital, becomes the main driving force behind innovative processes and activities. This is an indicator that determines the effectiveness and formation of socio-economic programs for the development of regions and the activities of the authorities using powerful institutional control systems. Political Islam is not ended. But political Islam will have to reconsider all aspects of life, and the Arab Spring should be a great lesson for the next generation.

The citizens of the Arab world look forward to real Islamic reforms based on freedom and justice. Politics shouldn't use religion, and religion should not use politics.

It is equally important to note that a promising vector for the transformation of the political elites of the Arab world in the context of their exit from the institutional crisis after the Arab Spring is the confrontation of Islamic fundamentalism, which is exacerbated mainly by economic and social problems, as with some evil that has materialized, and in the improvement of people's lives and the recovery of the economy, which in turn not only preserves but also contributes to the "resorption" of the negative manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism.

Promising scientific research on the topic described in this article are, firstly, the analysis of the preconditions and assessment of the prospects for the implementation of the new stage of the "Arab Spring"; determining the extent and specificity of the confrontation about democratic change, mostly autocratic and populist elites of the Arab world; secondly, promising research topics may focus on the rooting in the political practice of the Arab world of the ideas and practices of Islamic fundamentalism, as well as the deepening of autocratic, populist tendencies in the political governance of local political elites. No less interesting maybe research on the role of foreign political governance in the formation of political elites in the Arab world and the peculiarities of the usurpation of political power in some of them, such as Tunisia (the country where the Arab Spring began), where the local leader - Kais Saeed at the end of July 2021, it closed the democratically elected parliament, dismissed the prime minister, and lifted parliamentary immunity, barring deputies from leaving the country.

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