

THE MAIN DIRECTIONS OF RESOLVING THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN ARMED CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

Description: The development of international relations necessitates a new interpretation of certain categories and concepts in international law. However, despite such changes, the fundamental goal of the functioning of international law is to ensure peace on all continents and stable international cooperation. Even the most complex processes in interstate relations must be achieved through a settlement in accordance with the principles of international law, the violation of which by one of the states may cause the destabilization of international relations. Learning to turn to the mechanisms of settlement of interstate conflicts on the basis of the norms of international law is a guarantee of further development of our civilization, and any speculation by such norms can inevitably lead to degradation. One of the most important international issues for Ukraine today is the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the East. Its multifaceted interpretation does not allow us to see the real picture of relations between Russia and Ukraine, and also hinders the resolution of this conflict. That is why the urgency of the topic of the scientific article is due to the need to study possible scenarios for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in accordance with international law.

Methodology: The research methodology is based on the results of scientific studies of national (Ukrainian) and European scientists on the issues of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The research methodology used includes: deductive method, historical method, descriptive method and method of comparative analysis. The method of deduction is used in the study of the problem from general to partial. The descriptive method was used to cover the historical excursion of the events that formed the basis of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The comparative method made it possible to compare phenomena and processes that arise during the implementation of international law and the descriptive method gave characteristics to these phenomena and processes.

Results: In the article authors substantiate, that development and aggravation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict consists of the following stages: the occupation of the premises of the Supreme Council and the Government of the Crimean Autonomic Republic by the Russian special forces; creation of Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic; invasion of the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions by regular units of the Armed Forces of Russia.

According to the authors, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe play a key role in resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It adopted a number of decisions that defined the foundations of cooperation between the OSCE and Ukraine in the field of state security and launched the activities of the Special Monitoring Mission on the territory of Ukraine, which is designed to promote dialogue between the two countries.

In our opinion, the solution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the basis of international law is quite possible, but everything depends on the participants in this conflict. This is due to the fact that the reluctance of one of the parties to the conflict to resolve it in turn determines the low level of compliance with international law in this sphere.

Keywords: Law of armed conflicts, Law of war, Conflict, Armed conflict, Causes of armed conflict, Preconditions of armed conflict, Ways to resolve armed conflict, Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict.

INTRODUCTION

The development of international relations presupposes a new interpretation of certain categories and concepts in international law. However, despite such changes, the fundamental goal of the functioning of international law is to ensure peace on all continents, economic development of states and stable international cooperation. Even the most complex processes in interstate relations must be achieved through a settlement in accordance with the principles of international law, the violation of which by one of the states may cause the destabilization of international relations. Learning to turn to the mechanisms of settlement of interstate conflicts on the basis of the norms of international law is a guarantee of further development of our civilization, and any speculation by such norms can inevitably lead to degradation.

One of the most important international issues for Ukraine today is the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the east. Its multifaceted interpretation does not allow us to see the real picture of relations between Russia and Ukraine, and also hinders the resolution of this conflict. That is why there are many solutions to this problem in the research of scientists. Therefore, the relevance of the topic of scientific work is due to the need to study possible scenarios for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in accordance with international law. A relatively small number of studies have focused on the study of this issue. In particular, the problems of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the basis of the norms of international law were studied by such scientists as Chupriy L. V., Gai-Nyzhnyk P. P., Gorbulin V. P., Perepelytsia G. M., Sydoruk T. V., Vonsovich O. S., Yevtushenko I. V., Zagrebelny O. V. and others. However, the genesis, course and ways to resolve this conflict require a separate comprehensive research.

The object of the study is the general relations that are connected with the origin and course of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

The subject of the research is the ways of resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the basis of the norms of international law.

The purpose of the scientific article is a comprehensive study of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the basis of international law and the definition of possible ways to resolve it. The purpose of the study involves the following tasks: 1) to determine and systematize the causes and conditions of the emergence of conflict relations between Russia and Ukraine; 2) to establish the stages of development and aggravation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict; 3) to characterize the radical international legal ways of resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict; 4) to clarify the features of conformist and moderate

ways of resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine; 5) to characterize the reintegration of territories as a way of resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict; 6) to determine the forms of influence of foreign countries on the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict; 7) to characterize the participation of international organizations in resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology of our study is a set of legal concepts and principles. The main legal categories (concepts) include the concepts of conflict, social conflict, armed conflict, international conflict, civil conflict, war, civil war, Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, Russian-Ukrainian war, law of armed conflicts, law of war.

The research methodology is based on a holistic system of scientific methods. In particular, the method of dialectics was used in the study of various contradictory approaches to understanding the nature and further development of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, as well as the conflicting positions of the parties on ways to resolve it.

The historical method was used to study the causes and preconditions for the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict.

The descriptive method was used in the process of studying the main stages of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as in highlighting the consequences of each of these stages.

The use of the logical method contributed to the study of the motivation of the parties to the conflict, in particular, in relation to the reasons for its onset.

The comparative method was used to cover different types of armed conflicts that arose earlier, with the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

The method of generalization was the basis of the author's conclusions and generalizations regarding the understanding of the legal, social and political nature of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The conflict that has developed in Ukraine and has already led to the occupation of Crimea and armed confrontation in the country is, in a number of cases, mistakenly or unilaterally interpreted as a purely intra-Ukrainian problem (conflict). Narrowed or one-sided understanding of the essence of the conflict leads to the fact that the proposed ways to resolve it do not give the expected results (Analysis of dialogue initiatives on conflict resolution in Ukraine, 2015).

The problems of Ukrainian policy and law faced by Ukraine on the way to the EU include the following: social policy and legal regulation being burdened by armed conflict in the Donbas (Humeniuk, T.; Knysh, V.; Kuzenko, U., 2019).

If we make a brief historical excursion, we can recall that Russia's unfriendly actions against Ukraine were recorded in the autumn of 2003 near the island of Tuzla in the Sea of Azov. Since 2005, after the Orange Revolution, Russian officials have constantly reminded the West that Ukraine is a failed state. The gas wars of 2006 and 2009, designed to demonstrate Ukraine's unreliability as a gas transit country, can also be called elements of Russia's hybrid war against our country. A notable factor of the third force during the Euromaidan, the armed occupation of Crimea and the destabilization of the situation in Donbas is a continuation, not the beginning of the hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine (The role of the EU in resolving the war in eastern Ukraine, 2017).

O. V. Vonsovykh also holds the same opinion. According to the scientist, since the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the state of relations between Ukraine and Russia began to deteriorate and led to serious political and geopolitical contradictions (Vonsovykh, O. S., 2016).

The development of Ukrainian-Russian relations is not as friendly as that of two neighbours. The main preconditions for the emergence of the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, which, in general, turned into an armed aggression of Russia against Ukraine, are: 1) Russia's efforts to restore and expand control over part of the world and to maintain the world hegemony, which was lost with the collapse of the USSR and its economic decline; 2) Ukraine's efforts under economic, political and information pressure from Russia to maintain and expand its independence; 3) weakness of state institutions of Ukraine.

Russia's policy towards Ukraine has become a key precondition for the conflict. This policy, given the content of Russian propaganda in the media, has become simply hostile in recent years, transforming from anti-Ukrainian propaganda to war propaganda. In order to counteract the influence of Russian propaganda, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine in the summer of 2014 began to fight against separatist and anti-state materials in the media.

During one of the meetings of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Chargé d'Affaires of the United States under the auspices of the OSCE, Harry Kamian, cited four reasons for the conflict in eastern Ukraine: 1) Russia's violation of territory; Russia's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty; 2) Russia's violation of Ukraine's independence; repetition and continuation of violations of a number of the most important principles and commitments of the OSCE (4 causes of the conflict in Ukraine – the united states responded aptly and directly to Russia in the OSCE, 2017). According to G. M. Perepelytsia, based on the objective nature of the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict, it can obviously be argued that it is called upon to play a certain role in the development of Ukraine and in Ukraine. This is because conflicts are the driving force behind the change of social systems, which translates the social organization into a new quality (Perepelytsia, G. M., 2017).

Russia's policy towards Ukraine has undergone a three-phase evolution:

- 1) A Soft Belief in Eurasian Integration Under The Auspices Of Russia;
- 2) Hard Coercion to It (Using Political-Diplomatic, Economic, Energy, Information Levers Of Influence);
- 3) Direct Military Aggression.

The development and aggravation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict took place in the following directions:

- 1) Ideological support of the Russian leadership for the occupation of Donbas, which includes the following aspects:
- 2) Fabrication of the thesis about the coup d'état in Ukraine;
- 3) Dissemination of fake thesis about the "civil conflict";
- 4) Spreading propaganda that Donbas is not historically Ukrainian territory, but Novorossiia;
- 5) The Kremlin's stubborn emphasis on Russia's non-involvement in the armed conflict in Donbas (The war in Donbas: realities and prospects for settlement, 2019).

It should be noted that the Russian occupation tactics in Donbas included the following elements:

- 1) Large-scale militarization of the occupied region;
- 2) Creation of artificial attributes of independence and statehood (the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic);
- 3) Implementation of a purposeful and coordinated policy of absorption, alienation and rejection of Donbas from Ukraine;
- 4) Implementation of total political, ideological, social and cultural russification (so-called introduction of the all-Russian worldview) for the region.

During the armed aggression of Russia from its beginning on February 27 to the conclusion on September 5, 2014 of the so-called Minsk Protocol On the cessation of the use of weapons, the magazine Ukrainian Week distinguishes three phases (Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014: causes, course and political and legal assessments, 2014; Regarding the deployment of the OSCE special monitoring mission in Ukraine, 2014):

The first phase, where the Russian special forces forcibly seized the premises of the Supreme Council and the Government of the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic, which was accompanied by: a) the introduction of Russian armed formations into the territory of the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic; b) blockade of Ukrainian ports by the Black Sea Fleet of Russia; c) the creation and arming of irregular mercenary formations and their use, together with the personnel of the units of the armed forces of Russia, which were deployed in Crimea in accordance with the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the status of the conditions of stay of the Black Sea Fleet in the territory of the Russian Federation in 1997, and which had been illegally used for blockade the Ukrainian military

units, as well as to establish on the peninsula regime of military occupation (Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian federation on the status and conditions of stay of the black sea fleet of the Russian federation on the territory of Ukraine dated 28.05.1997 (as of 20.10.2010), 2010);

The second phase, which began in April 2014, when controlled, managed and financed by Russian special services armed groups proclaimed the creation of the Donetsk People's Republic (April 7, 2014) and Lugansk People's Republic (April 27, 2014);

The third phase, which began on August 27, 2014 with a mass invasion of the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions by regular units of the Armed Forces of Russia.

In turn, the publication Historical Truth presents four stages of Russia's hybrid war in Donbas:

1. January-March 2014 – Anti-Maidan and local uprising.
2. April-June 2014 – Russian Special Forces and nationalist volunteers.
3. July-August 2014 – a massive influx of weapons and tanks, accompanied by intense shelling of Ukraine from the Russian side of the border with Ukraine, forcing the Ukrainian army to relinquish control over this border;
4. September 2014 – in the period between the agreements Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 (September 2014 – February 2015). At this period Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic come under full Russian economic and financial control and separatist police was transformed into armed forces (Invasion, annexation and hybrid war. 5 years of the Russian spring, 2019).

According to V. P. Gorbulin, O. S. Vlasyuk and E. M. Libanova, the Russian aggression against Ukraine undermined the system of international relations, which had been building for decades, violating the security of the region (Gorbulin, V. P., 2016).

The Russian intervention took place in violation of many international agreements that ensured the maintenance of peace and stability in Ukraine and Europe: the UN Charter (Statute of the United Nations of June 26, 1945 (as of September 16, 2005), 2005), the Final Act of OSCE 1975 (Final act of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, 1975). According to modern international law, armed aggression is a particularly dangerous and serious international crime. Any act of aggression falling within the definition enshrined in UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (Definition of aggression: general assembly resolution, 1974) and confirmed in Art. 8-b of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome statute of the international criminal court, 1998), not only violates the fundamental sovereign rights of the state – the victim of armed aggression, but also encroaches on the foundations of international law (Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014: causes, course and political and legal assessments, 2014).

Thus, the emergence of conflict relations between Russia and Ukraine took place on the basis of: Russia's efforts to restore and expand control over part of the world; Ukraine's efforts under pressure from Russia to preserve and expand its independence; and of weakness of state institutions of Ukraine. The precondition for the conflict was Russia's openly hostile policy toward Ukraine, which manifested itself in the form of propaganda.

The development and aggravation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict includes the following stages: the capture of the premises of the Supreme Council and the Government of the Ukrainian Autonomic Republic by Russian Special Forces; creation of Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic; invasion of the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions by regular units of the Armed Forces of Russia.

Systematisation and generalization of forecasts of the Ukrainian expert medium makes it possible to single out scenarios for the development of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: scenarios of a radical character (total war, detachment of a part of a scenario or a scenario no war, no peace), as well as the scenario of reintegration.

Consider the scenario of total war. As S. V. Kononenko points out, totality is a general and comprehensive mobilization of society and the state for military victory. Total war is a purely defensive war for survival. Total war requires: constant readiness; mobilization and unification around military goals of all elements of social life (political, economic, technological, cultural); consolidating propaganda; one-man and responsible management; the maximum possible economic self-sufficiency (Kononenko, S. V., 2018).

The scenario of a total war is possible provided that the Russian leadership decides to launch open military aggression in order to obtain a land corridor to Crimea or access to its military contingent in Transnistria. Ukraine will be deprived of the choice of opportunities to resolve the conflict in Donbas by peace and will be forced to defend its independence, using all available resources (Chupriy, L. V.; Zagrebelny, O. V., 2017).

In turn, the scenario of cutting off or walls provides for the final abandonment of Ukraine from the occupied territories and a complete break with them. The further historical destiny of these territories will be of interest to Ukraine only from the point of view of ensuring its own security. The possibility of realization of this scenario is based on the presence of a significant mental gap between a certain part of the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied areas of Donbas and the majority of the Ukrainian society (Chupriy, L. V.; Zagrebelny, O. V., 2017).

According to O. Reznikov and C. Dremov, in Ukraine the implementation of the scenario of cutting off is to change the territorial structure of the country, which can be achieved in the following ways:

1. Conducting an all-Ukrainian referendum. It should be noted that in the case of cutting off of temporarily uncontrolled territories, the ratification referendum acquires the sign of a constitutional one, because in Art. 133 of the Constitution of Ukraine provide an exhaustive list of administrative-territorial units that are part of Ukraine. Therefore, the formation of a new administrative-territorial unit, its withdrawal from the structure of Ukraine requires the introduction of appropriate changes to the specified constitutional norm (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996).
2. Change of borders of Donetsk and Lugansk regions. It is quite obvious that the change of the territory of Ukraine should be connected with the liquidation or change of the borders of the respective regions, as only a part of Donetsk and Lugansk regions is beyond the control of the Ukrainian authorities. In view of this, several options for solving this problem are considered possible: reduction of Donetsk and Lugansk regions due to the cutting off of territories not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities with the transfer of regional centres to other cities; liquidation of Donetsk and Lugansk regions by handing over the territories under control to the Ukrainian authorities to Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kharkiv regions; formation of the territories of the new region under the control of the Ukrainian government.
3. Empowering the Supreme Council of Ukraine with the authority to resolve the issue of changing the territory of Ukraine. The current legal acts of Ukraine cannot ensure the effective and rapid implementation of the scenario of cutting off of uncontrolled territories. This is due to the imperfection of the procedures established by the legislation of Ukraine, the urgent need to harmonize the system of current regulations, which regulate public relations in this sphere (Reznikova, O.; Dryomov, S, 2015).

It is now possible to consider more moderate options for resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. One of these is the satelliteness scenario.

The satellite scenario envisages the search for ways of separate peace with Russia on favourable terms, the lack of interests of Western partners, the recognition of the autonomy of Donbas, and the refusal to return Crimea. This type of reconciliation will deprive the foreign policy of the Ukrainian state of a significant part of independence and link its historical destiny to the historical destiny of Russia (Chupriy, L. V.; Zagrebelny, O. V., 2017). The future of both states, if it becomes common again, is unlikely to demonstrate anything different from what has happened before in the history of these two peoples, and the path of loss, war and repression will be repeated again.

As noted by V. P. Gorbulin, O. S. Vlasyuk and E. M. Libanova, despite the absolute danger and unacceptability, some fragments of such a scenario can be traced over a short period of time. Short-term evidence during the Minsk talks, easy forgetting of the Crimean topic can be short-lived evidence (Gorbulin, V. P., 2015).

The next scenario is the freezing of the conflict. It consists in freezing the conflict on the model of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Russia, part of the European Union, and the most conformist and pro-Russian strata of European society are interested in such a decision. The essence of such a settlement is that the areas affected by the conflict, the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic, remain part of Ukraine, possibly under the conditions of granting them full powers (Chupriy, L. V.; Zagrebelny, O. V., 2017).

V. P. Gorbulin, O. S. Vlasyuk and E. M. Libanova define such a sequence of events of this scenario:

1. Cessation of hostilities on the entire front line.
2. Relative stabilization of the socio-economic situation in the occupied territories.
3. Further internal legitimization of the puppet regimes of Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic through uncoordinated elections with Ukraine and other measures aimed at sovereignty or accession to Russia.
4. Actual and official representation of the interests of Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic by Russia in international formats.
5. Actual change in the subject of negotiations and negotiation format: instead of the conditions for the reintegration of the occupied territories into Ukraine, the subjects of negotiations are the conditions for concluding peace between Ukraine and Russia (Gorbulin, V. P., 2015).

In turn, the scenario of neither war nor peace or limited war and permanent negotiations makes it possible to achieve the maximum result with the least casualties, although it requires a lot of time, skill and patience (Chupriy, L. V.; Zagrebelny, O. V., 2017).

According to V. P. Gorbulin, O. S. Vlasyuk and E. M. Libanova, the scenario of neither war nor peace provides:

- 1) A limited and civil war against Russia and the collaborators on the way in order to inflict as many demotivating losses as possible;
- 2) Constant negotiation process;
- 3) Increasing the military potential of Ukraine and the gradual transition from blocking the enemy to its expulsion;
- 4) Increase in the intensity of international sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Russia;
- 5) Consistent and radical reform of the Ukrainian society;
- 6) Rapprochement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), as well as the formation of a number of defence alliances with part of the post-Soviet and Central European states (Gorbulin, V. P., 2015).

The implementation of this scenario will require political skills and moral endurance, the actions of the armed forces of rapid response and special purpose, flexible and creative diplomacy. It should be

noted that we are currently dealing with this scenario with regard to all territories temporarily uncontrolled by Ukraine.

As P. P. Gai-Nyzhnyk points out, of the five scenarios mentioned above, the first and last ones consider the resolution of the conflict by military means and, in fact, assign the dominant role to the party of war, although in the first scenario and in the fifth – from Ukraine. The three other scenarios for the development of Ukrainian-Russian relations (walls, satelliteness and freezing) are essentially scenarios for the peaceful settlement of the conflict, and it is precisely from the choice of tactics and tactics that will be based on the choice of tactics and tactics (Gai-Nyzhnyk, P. P., 2016).

The scenario of resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine by reintegrating the territories looks the most difficult, but from the point of view of Ukraine's national interests, ensuring long-term regional stability and the goals of state development.

Reintegration means the return of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, the population living on them, in a single constitutional space of Ukraine (Dutsyk, D.; Chernysh, V; Voronina, V, 2019).

According to P. P. Gai-Nyzhnyk, the reintegration scenario envisages:

- 1) Joint provision by the parties to the conflict of de-escalation of confrontation and demilitarization of the region, complete withdrawal of Russian troops and separatist armed formations, provision of full control over this territory;
- 2) Institutional support of civil dialogue and formation of a consensus in the society on reintegration of post-conflict territories;
- 3) The formation of the Public Council on Donbas issues and the provision of permanent social communications with the participation of persons outside politics;
- 4) Coordination in working groups and the possibility of adopting new laws on the formation of separate districts with separate administrative statutes – Northern Donbas and Southern Donbas;
- 5) Enshrining in the Constitution of Ukraine the notion of distinctive districts, the status and powers of which should be defined by the law on regional self-government (in addition to the law on local self-government), which will define the power of attorney;
- 6) Holding elections to local self-government bodies in separate districts and by-elections to the Supreme Council of Ukraine in constituencies where these elections did not take place in 2014;
- 7) Reaching agreements with the representatives of the Northern and Southern Donbas on bringing their internal normative legal acts in accordance with the law on the status of special areas and disarmament of paramilitary formations;
- 8) Holding elections of the leadership of certain districts in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine and relevant laws (Gai-Nyzhnyk, P. P., 2016).

On January 18, 2018, the law of Ukraine On the specifics of state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Lugansk regions was adopted, which is known as the law on the reintegration of Donbas. In Art. 5 of this law states that in order to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, the state authorities and their officials act on the basis, within the powers and in the ways that are enshrined by the Constitution and by the laws of Ukraine:

- 1) Take measures to protect the rights and freedoms of the civilian population;
- 2) Take measures to ensure national security and defence, repel and contain the armed aggression of the Russian Federation;
- 3) Develop the defence and security potential of Ukraine with the involvement of state and international resources in order to repel the armed aggression of the Russian Federation;
- 4) Use the mechanisms of bilateral international cooperation, international organizations and international courts in order to maintain and strengthen the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation (On the peculiarities of the state policy on ensuring the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions: law of Ukraine, 2018).

Thus, given the conditions prevailing in the Ukrainian society as a whole and in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions separately, this plan for the reintegration of Donbas has been steadily focused on restoring the integrity of the national organization. The reintegration plan can be implemented only with the unconditional dominance of the peace party.

It should be summarized that the radical internationally-lawful ways of solving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are: the scenario of total war (characterized by open military aggression from Russia), the scenario of cutting off or walls (characterized by the complete refusal of Ukraine from the occupied territories and a complete break with them).

Moderate ways of resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine are: the scenario of satellite (a separate peace between Russia and Ukraine, recognition of the autonomy of the Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic, refusal to return Crimea), the rejection of the special status), A scenario of no war, no peace or limited war and permanent negotiations (includes a limited war against Russia, a standing negotiation process, building up the military potential of Ukraine). Reintegration of territories, as a way to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is characterized by the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces and separatist armed formations from the occupied territories, The formation of a civil dialogue, the provision of constant social communications, the consolidation of the concept of a special region in the Constitution of Ukraine, the holding of elections to local self-government bodies in formerly occupied territories.

It should be noted that international and European organizations have played an important role in resolving the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. In particular, after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Russian troops in the Donbass by Western countries and a number of international organizations imposed sanctions against Russia:

First, Russia's participation in international organizations was limited. In particular, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) deprived the Russian delegation of the right to vote and expelled Russians from all governing bodies. Russia was excluded from the G8, and the process of Russia's accession to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) was blocked. NATO has curtailed all programs with Russia and drastically limited political dialogue with the Kremlin;

Secondly, the EU and the leading countries of the world (USA, Japan, Canada, Australia) imposed targeted sanctions against Russian government officials, parliamentarians, politicians, businessmen, businessmen, and the military, special services, business structures, as well as sectoral sanctions (The war in Donbas: realities and prospects for settlement, 2019).

Let us turn to the analysis of the actions of specific countries on this issue. Thus, Poland has responded to the crisis in Ukraine since its first days. The Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, the signing of an association agreement with Ukraine, and the prevention of further violence in Ukraine were central to Polish bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In the EU, Poland supported visa restrictions and economic sanctions against Moscow and their expansion in response to the continuation of Russia's military aggression in Ukraine, and in NATO it actively advocated the confirmation of the guarantees of Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty (North Atlantic treaty, 1949) with the help of practical steps to strengthen the territorial security of the neighbouring suburbs of the Alliance (Sydoruk, T. V., 2016). Undoubtedly, Germany plays a key role in shaping the EU's common position on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Germany's influence was present not only in the implementation of effective EU sanctions against Russia in March 2014 and their expansion in July and September 2014, but also in the disruption of the South Stream pipeline project, the slowdown in the rapprochement of Hungary and Russia, the issue of sanctions against the opposite camp and indirect influence through Paris on other southern member states (Sydoruk, T. V., 2015).

In general, German policy fits into the general approach to the EU conflict, which contains 3 components: sanctions against Russia, financial support for Ukraine and the search for negotiation formats to resolve certain aspects of the conflict.

Consider the position of one of the Baltic States – Lithuania. This country undoubtedly supports Ukraine by condemning the aggression of Russia against Ukraine. She categorically insists on the recognition of the Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic as terrorist organizations,

supports anti-Russian campaigns, is ready to supply weapons to Ukraine and conducts training of the Ukrainian military in Lithuania. And all this despite the fact that Lithuania has lost half of its export in Russia and topped the list of EU countries that suffered the most from the Russian embargo. Despite all this, Vilnius invariably remains in the guard of the hard opponents of the Kremlin (Sydoruk, T. V., 2016).

In general, sanctions restrictions in the sphere of investments, new technologies, supplies of equipment for the oil and gas industry, and the curtailment of joint projects in the production of carbohydrates are quite sensitive for the Russian economy. For example, the most powerful American company ExxonMobil stopped nine out of 10 projects in Russia; the EU blocked the financing of three leading Russian fuel and energy companies. A number of Western countries have imposed restrictions or suspended cooperation with Russia in the field of high technologies, in the financial, agro-industrial, space, military, etc. spheres. In particular, since March 2019, the EU has extended for six months a package of sanctions against Russia, involving 155 individuals and 44 organizations (this package of sanctions was also supported by Albania, Norway, Montenegro and Ukraine). More than 400 Russian companies and about 200 Russian citizens are subject to US sanctions (The war in Donbas: realities and prospects for settlement, 2019).

The Russian intervention in Donbas was actively discussed in various formats, which was embodied in the relevant decisions and acts of international institutions. The documents adopted on this issue stipulate support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, condemnation of Russia's aggressive policy, and emphasize the need for implementation (The war in Donbas: realities and prospects for settlement, 2019).

At present, international security is the guarantor of world self-preservation and sustainable development. The subjects of international security are international organizations designed to ensure compliance with security. Most of the international organizations are the basis of international peace and security, ensure compliance with generally accepted norms of international law not only by member states of these organizations, but also by other entities. The priority place in the settlement of the armed conflict in the South-East of Ukraine belongs to the key intergovernmental international organizations concerned with peace and security in the world – the UN and the OSCE.

The activities of the UN Security Council in support of peace and security are to determine these or other sanctions against violating states (including military operations against them), the introduction of peacekeeping forces in conflict zones, the organization of post-conflict, post-conflict conflict. In addition, the Council may resort to coercive measures, in particular: the imposition of economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions and travel bans; rupture of diplomatic relations; blockades; collective military activities. However, the UN Charter contains obstacles to the

settlement of the armed conflict on the territory of Ukraine. Thus, according to the Charter of the Organization, the Security Council consists of 5 permanent members (Great Britain, Russia, the People's Republic of China, the United States, France, France) and 10 non-member countries. Decisions of the Security Council (other than procedural) require 9 votes out of 15, including coincidental votes of all permanent members. This means that each of the five permanent members of the Security Council has a veto over the decisions of the Council. Therefore, Russia will always have the right to veto all UN actions aimed at escalating the armed conflict in Ukraine (Yevtushenko, I. V., 2015).

The main role in resolving the armed conflict now belongs to the OSCE. A special feature of the Organization is the presence of field operations, which operate directly in some member states and provide the necessary assistance at their request. Decisions in the OSCE are adopted by consensus.

The issue of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the destructive impact of the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine on the European security architecture has been a priority on the OSCE agenda since February 2014. Among the vast majority of OSCE participating States, there is a realization that restoring confidence in the Organization's territory is impossible without correcting Russia's grossly violated OSCE principles and commitments. Taking into account the consensual decision-making procedure in the governing bodies of the OSCE (the Summit, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Council, the Forum on Security Issues), it has now been possible to adopt the following:

- 1) Decision of the OSCE Permanent Council of 21 March 2014 PC.DEC / 1117 On the deployment of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (Regarding the deployment of the OSCE special monitoring mission in Ukraine, 2014);
- 2) Declaration of the 1034th (special) meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council of 20.01.2015 RC.DOC / 2/15 (. Declaration of the 1034th (special) meeting of the OSCE permanent council, 2015);
- 3) Declaration in support of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine as a result of the tragic incident that took place on April 23, 2017 (Declaration in support of the OSCE special monitoring mission in Ukraine following the tragic incident, 2017).

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine began its work on the basis of a request from the Government of Ukraine to the OSCE and a consensus decision of all 57 OSCE participating States. Its main tasks are to monitor and report impartially and objectively on the situation in Ukraine, as well as to promote dialogue between all parties to the conflict. The mission includes about 250 civilian unarmed observers from OSCE participating states, whose activities are supported by Ukrainian workers. The Mission is headquartered in Kyiv, with guards located in Herzon, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Luhansk. Guardians are called upon to help

reduce tensions, bring peace, stability and security. In order to promote dialogue on the ground, the mission interacts with the authorities at all levels, as well as with civil society, ethnic and religious groups and local communities (Yevtushenko, I. V., 2015).

Today, the mission employs 1,349 unarmed civilians from 44 countries, including 810 international observers, 119 management, advisers, analysts, and 420 local staff. 600 international observers work directly in the conflict zone. Among the observers, the largest number of representatives of the USA – 62, Great Britain – 58, Poland – 38, Russia – 37 (The war in Donbas: realities and prospects for settlement, 2019).

Thus, the main forms of influence of foreign countries on the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are: restriction of Russia's participation in international organizations; introduction of targeted and sectoral sanctions against Russia by the world's leading countries; establishment of financial and economic restrictions for Russian enterprises, institutions and organizations; introduction of visa restrictions for Russian citizens.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has played a key role in resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It adopted a number of decisions that defined the foundations of cooperation between the OSCE and Ukraine in the field of state security and launched the activities of the Special Monitoring Mission on the territory of Ukraine, which is designed to promote dialogue between the two countries.

CONCLUSIONS

According to the results of our study, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. It was established that the emergence of conflict relations between Russia and Ukraine took place on the basis of: Russia's efforts to restore and expand control over part of the world; Ukraine's efforts under pressure from Russia to maintain and expand its independence; weakness of state institutions of Ukraine. The precondition for the conflict was Russia's openly hostile policy toward Ukraine, which manifested itself in the form of propaganda.
2. It is proved that the development and aggravation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict consists of the following stages: the occupation of the premises of the Supreme Council and the Government of the Crimea Autonomous Republic by the Russian special forces; creation of Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic; invasion of the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions by regular units of the Armed Forces of Russia.
3. Radical international legal ways of resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are characterized. It is determined that they are: the scenario of total war (characterized by open military aggression on the part of Russia, enhanced mobilization of Ukraine), the scenario of cutting off or walls characterizes the characterization.

4. We also have approved, that moderate ways of resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine are: the scenario of satellite (a separate peace between Russia and Ukraine, recognition of the autonomy of the Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic, refusal to return Crimea), the rejection of the special status), a scenario of no war, no peace or limited war and permanent negotiations (includes a limited war against Russia, a standing negotiation process, building up the military potential of Ukraine).

5. In our opinion, reintegration of territories, as a way to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is characterized by the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces and separatist armed formations from the occupied territories, the formation of a civil dialogue, the provision of constant social communication, the consolidation of the concept of a special region in the Constitution of Ukraine, the holding of elections to local self-government bodies in formerly occupied territories.

6. It is proved that the main forms of influence of foreign countries on the solution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are: restriction of Russia's participation in international organizations; introduction of targeted and sectoral sanctions against Russia by the world's leading countries; establishment of financial and economic restrictions for Russian enterprises, institutions and organizations; introduction of visa restrictions for Russian citizens.

7. It is stated that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe played a key role in resolving the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It adopted a number of decisions that defined the foundations of cooperation between the OSCE and Ukraine in the field of state security and launched the activities of the Special Monitoring Mission on the territory of Ukraine, which is designed to promote dialogue between the two countries.

In our opinion, the solution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the basis of international law is quite possible, but everything depends on the participants in this conflict. This is due to the fact that the reluctance of one of the parties to the conflict to resolve it in turn determines the low level of compliance with international law in this sphere.

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