THE ROLE OF THE BOARDS IN STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION IN ORGANIZATIONS

Edwin Agwu, The University of Central Lancashire

ABSTRACT

Most organizations exist in very competitive and dynamic environment and more often craft strategies that will enable them to not only stay afloat, but to win by achieving their goals more effectively than their competitors. Strategy in this context is the selection of the organisation's goals and developing ways that will enable them to achieve these set goals. It is also an iterative process where different ways to achieve an organisation's goal (goals) are tried and refined in an effort to become more effective and efficient in customer satisfaction. It is typically characterised by being long term and uncertain. More often, it is the management team that proposes and presents the strategic plans to the board of directors. This is because it is believed that the management is best able to dedicate time to strategic thinking and more likely to have greater industry knowledge and experience. The boards generally are responsible for overall governance and these includes oversight functions of organisational performance and compliance with all legal and regulatory requirements of the organization and they also serve as watchdogs of the management teams. Furthermore, it is the board's duty to understand, test and endorse the organizations strategies. This study being descriptive in approach, employed secondary data for the review of various published works with the synthesis of various theories. Findings reveal clear misunderstandings of meanings and the exact roles of boards. This study contends that for better performances, boards should among others, be actively involved in both the development and execution of organizational strategies to ensure a holistic achievement of all round growth of the organization.

Keywords: Strategy Development, Strategy Execution, Board, Roles, Organizations.

INTRODUCTION

The day-to-day impacts of the roles of board of directors are difficult to observe but becomes the focus of attention when things go wrong. Globally, research throughout the most recent decades has clearly established that board members and directors are placing a lot of emphasis and devoting more time and energies to corporate governance issues, and this is dominating literatures within this sector as it is considered an important role for boards (Anderson, Melanson, & Maly, 2007; Chen, Osofsky, & Stephenson, 2008; Radomska, 2014). This has led to disruptions in the corporate governance frameworks, and has increased more focus of boards on strategizing due to the globalization and advancement of financial markets. Furthermore, the rise in corporate administration scandals, and more grounded requests for responsibility and straight-forwardness have set the obligations and working of boards of executives at the focus of the corporate administration debates (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2005; Machold & Farquhar, 2013; Zhu, Wang, & Bart, 2016). The call for board inclusion in strategy developments and executions have raised the issue of designing and explaining the proper job roles of board members and what their specific roles ought to be (Jensen & Zajac, 2004). Researchers

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11

and practitioners have for the most part recognized the significance of sufficient board control and autonomy (Jensen & Zajac, 2004), board inclusion and active roles in the day-to-day administration of organizations have been generally discussed in terms of autonomy and interdependence (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Zhu et al., 2016). Boards' strategic involvement has been associated with a mix of relevant components, exchanges of hypothetical points of views, and uncertain experimental outcomes. To begin with, it was observed that most of the boards of directors in the United States had been fairly uninvolved in the wake of corporate disappointments and failures and more inclusion was important to re-establish the confidence of the public in the governing of most organizations (Clendenin, 1972; Heller & Milton, 1972; Machin & Wilson, 1979; Radomska, 2014). Two factors are driving these assertions; first, there is an implicit assumption in the literature that board involvements in strategy leads to more effective organizational performances. Second, there is a significant concern, especially from a practitioner perspective, that corporate strategy reforms are forcing boards to focus ever-increasing attention on compliances, often at the expense of strategy. The net effect is that many directors are worried that their boards are underemphasizing their role in driving better organizational performance (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Grossman, 2002; Radomska, 2014; Zhu et al., 2016). The associative challenges posed by the strategy implementation processes has increased the position of the boards to challenge Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) to become more engaged with the organizational strategy, an area that was once neglected in the past (Ruigrok et al., 2006; Monks & Minow, 2008; Zhu et al., 2016). Also, the theoretical viewpoints have asserted that boards have different responsibilities as regards strategy. While few scholars (e.g. Heracleous, 2001; Huse, 2005) argue that boards are becoming aware of their strategic roles, others (e.g. (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996; Deutsch, 2005; Radomska, 2014) argue that ambiguity occurs between the role of boards within the organization and their role as strategy makers and executioners. Most of the research works on boards of directors have touched more on the singular question of ‘’what is the role of the board? But none within available literature has discussed the role of boards on strategy development and execution; hence this paper fills the gap by contextualising these glaring gaps and ensuring its robust understanding. This objective of this study and the burning question is: Can an organizational board effectively play the active role of strategy development and execution?

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature provides different explanations for the prevalent gaps in how boards play significant role in development and implementation of strategy (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Thuraisingham, 2019). The role of the board as an agency of the organization in relation to how researchers view boards composition, and the access to these processes has been considered a challenge to researchers culminating to the compositional and structural dimension of boards (Leblanc & Gilles, 2005; Judge, 2011). A significant number of researchers are moving past this overwhelming rationale and dedicating more regard for the procedures, practices and behaviors influencing boards' exercises (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007). Investigations of board forms and dynamics utilize an alternate paradigm to uncover what processes do and give more consideration to the inward communications and interactions that occurs at a board level (Hendry et al., 2010).

The principle centre here is not about basic elements of board structure, but on how board members satisfy their assignments and what procedures are probably going to shape board elements (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Concentrates in this custom watch activities and cooperation of the

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11

board and guarantee that board results are definitely not just the consequence of a board's structure, yet additionally of consistent and progressing collaborations inside furthermore, outside meeting room (Maitlis, 2004). The levels of independence of boards in organizations are often linked to the strategic strength of the board members (Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007). The independence of the board from the management provides them with the opportunity to assess the activities of the management from an objective perspective, and thus they provide an analysis that is void of subjectivity but more of objectivity. These oversight analyses provide the organizational management a stream of controls to monitor and objectively quantify the performances of the organization in relation to managements' input (Hussain, Ahmad, & Hassan, 2019). The management in turn respects these positions and thus remain in a checkmate status due to the watch from the independent board (Ngu & Amran, 2018; Hussain et al., 2019).

Bebchuk & Cohen (2005) found that when boards are staggered, firms experience low valuations. Using the Tobin's Q measurement which is Total Market Value of Firm / Total Asset Value of Firm. This explains the measures of a firm's assets in relation to the firms market value. Furthermore, this measurement further stressed that the extent to which firms perform is dependent on the efficacy of the strength of their board especially in the core area of their operations. This means that boards play significant role in ensuring a stable and competent firm in their development and execution of various strategies. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) also reported that the tendency for a board without a defined strategic role to make mistakes during acquisition is very high. This is because boards are required to make strategic decisions that will favour the organization, and in situations where such is absent, this action always lead to bad acquisitions which negatively affects the company return on investments. The value of an organization is dependent on the strategic decision of the organizations' board; in this case, if there is need for acquisition of new property or competitive firms, the onus is on the board to make good and logical decision of acquiring such firms or declining from acquiring them as the case maybe for better organizational growth.

Faleye (2007) reports that board' strategic decisions and strategy implementations are associated with whether a firm chief executive officer performs or not. This according to Faleye is because, a strategic board are sensitive to the organization CEO's pay, and they try to ensure that this pay is equivalent to the job role that is required to be carried out by the CEO. Faleye (2007) therefore concluded that boards that are sensitive to the ratio of the CEO's pay to the performance will enhance the CEO's job or and performance than board that do not. Yilmaz & BuyukluI (2016) studied the effect of board and corporate governance and it affects firm's performance. They reported that the level of independence of members and the leverage they have affect the performance of the firm in a negative dimension, while the extent to which a firm is owned by foreigners determines to a positive extent the firms' performance. Lückerath-Rovers (2013) on the other took a step forward to evaluate how the board with or without the presence of a woman make strategic decisions that affect the firm performance. They found that firms that had women on their boards make strategic decisions that are more favorable to the organization than firms without women on their board. This implied that making and executing strategy requires that firm look beyond gender in order to achieve their organization objective and goals.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Managerial Hegemony Theory

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11

Managerial hegemony hypothesis proposed by Mace (1971) argues that the board of an organization is fiction that legally dominated the management of the organization. This gives them the opportunity to passively direct the organizations' strategy. The theory was summed on five different mechanisms for management control. The first of the control mechanisms (Zhang, 2015; Hunt, 2016) is such that the boards are separated from the ownership and control of the organization, thereby leading to a diluted form of power for smooth running of the organizations' activities. The tendency is to reduce to a bearer level the control of shareholders, and then empower the management, which have also been linked to self-serving and financial losses (Rubino et al., 2016). The second is the differences in the expertise and communication between those who manage the organization and those that are in charge of the smooth running of the organization. The managerial domination puts the board and directors in the dark due to their level of expertise and technical know-how that has been increased overtime (Hung, 1998; Clarke, 2004; Kiel & Beck, 2006; Aluchna, 2016).

The third mechanism of control centers on the inability of the managers to rely on shareholders due to the profit maximization from their organization. It is assumed that mangers in profitability industries or organization will not rely on shareholders, and hence their control of the organization is increased, thus retaining power to make critical financial decisions (Mizruchi, 1983; Pavicevic et al., 2018; Paniagua et al., 2018). The fourth is that management ability to handpick the board members increases their chances of dominating and imposing their will on the board. The fifth mechanism of control focused on the non-executive director acting dual role of being on the board. This raises the question of objectivity in dealing with how to manage the conflict that may arise from this dual role.

The effect of these five mechanisms of control is that the organizational strategy is centred on the role played senior management. Thus instead of the board acting as a strategy developer, the managerial hegemony theory postulates that they are like passive rubber stamp (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2001; Alshareef & Sandhu, 2015; Booth-Bell, 2018). Critically, there has been research that does not support the managerial hegemony hypothesis, citing inadequate research findings and vague explanation of the word control as support for their stand (Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Stiles, 2001; Sanchez et al., 2017).

Agency Theory

Agency theory was proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) to explain the relationship between two actors in an organizational context. The two actors namely the principal and the agent work together simultaneously in risk sharing and also try to avoid conflict of interest when dealing with matters concerning the organizational strategy and growth. The theory assume that agent take opportunity by acting within the sphere of bounded rationality as they try to satisfy their self-first before thinking of how the organization or the principal will maximize profit (Bravo, 2018). According to agency theory, the board exists to create convergence of interest between the management and shareholders of a company, therefore reducing the cost that may have been incurred due to interest divergence, and ensuring that the interests of the shareholders are protected (Melis & Nijhof, 2018). The role of the board is such that they act as control mechanism for the organization. They try to ensure that these control cut across different sphere of the organization stemming from the chief executive officer, to the least employees in the organization (Melis & Nijhof, 2018). Although the role of the board seems to cover every aspect of the organization dealings, there are still no definitive set out rules that stipulates that their role includes acting as the

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11

strategic experts of heads for the organization (Zhara & Pearce, 1989; Wang et al., 2018). There is little or no documentation that stipulates or support that boards act as strategist for the organization, hence this has brewed more contentions among scholars and practitioners (Rashid, 2015). suggested that the literature is still scanty as regards how boards exercise their control over organizational managers. Aberg et al (2017) stated that through the lens of agency theory, there are implications for the role of boards as it relates to the control mechanism. They opined that the control exercise by boards acts as a pointer to how effectively an organization perform, and thus, leads to shape the future direction of how organizations develop or implement their strategic decisions.

Stewardship Theory

The stewardship theory to argue that managers are not individuals seeking their own gain or their selfish interest alone, rather they are intrinsically motivated towards achieving greater gains for the organization, and they also take charge to pursue opportunities through the need to achieve, thereby, performing and engaging in challenging work that position them to be recognized by bosses and colleagues (Lok et al., 2016). This idea does not see the managers from the financial individual waiting to claim personal victory or gains, rather as one who is supporting the organization big dreams for competitive advantage. Thus, the strategic role of the board in this context is to ensure that the role of the manager as a steward is supported (Stiles, 2001; Lok et al., 2016). The stewardship approach also argues that the inter-dominated boards contribute immensely due to their depth of expertise and commitment to the organization. This in turn facilitates a strategy role taken by the board within and outside the organization (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Cornforth & Macmillan, 2016). The strategic role of the board takes a different form such that they may not be that visible in their approach or take a defined strategic role. For instance, because they are labeled the board, or board members, their activities or contributions is defined in the context of this defined role, even if other roles like strategic decisions are being incorporated in their dealings with other strategic members of the organization (Castro, Galan, & Casanueva, 2016).

Resource Dependence Theory

Resource dependence theory was obtained from the intersection between sociology and economics. The theory focuses on the interlocking between shareholders and their relationship with competitors (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The theory sums the ratio of the corporation between an organization and their external environment. This relationship becomes important because the resources from or in the external environment position the organization for a better competitive advantage if they are obtained, but this is dependent on the type or level of relationship that exists between the organization and the significant factor from the external environment (Arora & Sharma, 2016; Arulvel & Pratheepkanth, 2019). Thus, a good relationship with the external environment position the organization to be saved from harsh or unpalatable environmental conditions (De Villiers, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2011; Drees & Heugens, 2013)

The implication of this theory is that the expected and the actual role of boards take a mixed form. Stiles (2001) proposed that the elementary role of the board is to contribute strategically to the organization through information acquisition and sharing, others (e.g. Hung, 1998; Hung, 2011; Kamardin & Haron, 2011) argued that boards are positioned only to acquire or attain organizational resources rather than putting those resources to actual usage. Thus, according to Carpenter and Westpal (2001), the role of the board is to serve as a consultant to organizations' top managers rather than acting as a strategy implementer. This implied that information obtained by the board is

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11

not encompassing in itself, rather, it is dependent on the relational side-by-side placing by top managers (Shrospire, 2010; De Villiers et al., 2011; Rao & Tilt, 2016). In this case, they try to see the advantages and disadvantages of this information based on the application or field challenges.

Gaps in Theories

The theories are driven by two philosophies, namely; the passive and active school of thoughts. The passive school is centred on the dominating nature of boards. For instance, the managerial hegemony theory that posits boards as having both the internal and external control over the affairs of the organization with the aim of making productive and realistic organizational strategy. The active school of thought on the other hand relies on the premise that boards acts as servants to the organization, and thus, they are not actively doing the managements' work, but rather act as mechanism of control. The theories adopted and elucidated above focused only on one aspect of the role of boards, whether as being active or passive. The gap found is centred is on the relational fact that both school of thoughts does not have a mixed of the dual role of boards, which invariably is what this study is set out to achieve. To this end, this study takes a dual approach to explicate boards' role as dual; development and execution, towards making a better organization management. This is in the hope that there will be a converging point for researchers and practitioners.

METHODOLOGY

This study was largely descriptive in its approach. Secondary data were collected from different peer reviewed literature using desk research method. This information includes data that evaluates the role of boards, as well as information regarding their role in the strategy of organizations. Evidences were provided based on the inclusion criteria of the articles used. The justification for the secondary data used was that the study dealt with strategic issues that are ambiguous both in definition and in literature. This therefore makes it important to obtain evidences from published literature.

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION

The study explored the composition of boards in relation to their roles in developing and executing organizational strategies. The passive-active theory of board composition was highlighted and enumerated by looking at their contribution and shortfalls. This study therefore hinged on the argument that managerial perspective that once considered boards as a static role players are or as role dictators are not significantly correct. This may be due to the lack of literature in the area of synthesizing and defining the strategic role of boards, as well as the categorization of their strategic role as proxies rather than a defined and outlined measures of their functioning capacities. In order to define a newer frontier, this study built on the limitation of the adopted theories to argue that boards play and act in dualism, thus, acting as both the developer and executioner of organizational strategies. This proposition takes into account their roles in control mechanism as well as their roles as organizational diversified information. The control is such that the management is constrained not to go overboard in their decisions and actions by the boards, and this helps the organization to chart a course in their strategic control mechanisms (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). This perspective puts the board, at first, an active employee of the organization through rigorous selection processes, and second, as the organizations' internal auditors. The boards' roles

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11

though have been interpreted by various theories (Hilman & Dalziel, 2003; Sundararamurphy & Lewis, 2003); this study incorporates previous elucidations by taking the multiple lens approach, allowing for better understanding of boards' roles and a defined relationship between the board and the organizational management. The implication of this to practitioners and academics evolved as well in this study. For practitioners, this study suggests that the role of boards in the development and execution of strategies by the board members helps drive better organizational performances for competitive advantage. It also argued that there is need to differentiate between the roles of the board and that of the management, seeing that there is vague clarity about the dichotomy of boards' roles in some organizations. This study does not argue that there should be stand-alone role for the management, but rather they should be put in check by the board members that act as the watchdogs for the overall stakeholders of the organization (Hilman & Dalziel, 2003). The implication to academics is hinged on the pathway of theoretical developments and testing. From this study, further theories regarding the strategic role of boards in relation to firm performances, institutional ownerships, and organizational impact can be expatiated.

Direction for Further Studies

The study is not without gaps, as it takes a position as to what the roles of boards are in developing and executing strategy. To this end, qualitative, quantitative, or and mixed method of inquiry are required to investigate this roles in relation to firm performances. Longitudinal studies can also be employed to check the variability in boards' diversification as well as their roles in acting as the mechanism of control for the organization through financial and strategic balancing.

REFERENCES

Carl, Å., Kazemargi, N., & Max, B. (2017). Strategists on the board in a digital era. *Business and Management Research*, *6*(2), 40-51.

Alshareef, M.N.Z., & Sandhu, K. (2015). Adoption of corporate social responsibility: Board competencies and roles. *International Journal of Business and Management*, *10*(6), 75.

Bellucci, M., & Manetti, G. (2018). *Stakeholder engagement and sustainability reporting*. Routledge.

Anderson, D.W., Melanson, S.J., & Maly, J. (2007). The Evolution of Corporate Governance: power redistribution brings boards to life. *Corporate Governance: an international review*, *15*(5), 780-797.

Arora, A., & Sharma, C. (2016). Corporate governance and firm performance in developing countries: evidence from India. *Corporate governance*, *16*(2), 420-436.

Arulvel, K.K., & Pratheepkanth, P. (2019). Board composition and firm performance: The Sri Lankan case. *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (Oman Chapter)*, *8*(1), 40-49.

Bebchuk, L.A., & Cohen, A. (2005). The costs of entrenched boards. *Journal of financial economics*, *78*(2), 409-433.

Booth-Bell, D. (2018). Social capital as a new board diversity rationale for enhanced corporate governance. *Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society*, *18*(3), 425-439.

Bravo, F., Reguera-Alvarado, N., & del Pilar Pérez, M. (2018). The role of directors: unravelling the effects of boards on corporate outcomes. *International Journal of Managerial Finance*, *14*(4), 399-413.

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11

Carpenter, M.A., & Westphal, J.D. (2001). The strategic context of external network ties: Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision making. *Academy of Management journal*, *44*(4), 639-660.

Castro, I., Galán, J.L., & Casanueva, C. (2016). Management of alliance portfolios and the role of the board of directors. *Journal of Business Economics and Management*, *17*(2), 215-233.

Chen, A., Osofsky, J., & Stephenson, E. (2008). Making the board more strategic: a McKinsey Global Survey. *The McKinsey Quarterly, February*, 1-10.

Clarke, T. (2004). Theories of corporate governance. *The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance, Oxon*, *12*(4), 244-266.

Clendenin, W.D. (1972). Company presidents look at the board of directors. *California Management Review*, *14*(3), 60-66.

Cornforth, C., & Macmillan, R. (2016). Evolution in board chair–CEO relationships: A negotiated order perspective. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, *45*(5), 949-970.

Daily, C.M., Dalton, D.R., & Cannella Jr, A.A. (2003). Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and data. *Academy of management review*, *28*(3), 371-382.

Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. *Academy of Management review*, *22*(1), 20-47.

De Villiers, C., Naiker, V., & Van Staden, C.J. (2011). The effect of board characteristics on firm environmental performance. *Journal of Management*, *37*(6), 1636-1663.

Deutsch, Y. (2005). The impact of board composition on firms' critical decisions: A meta-analytic review. *Journal of Management*, *31*(3), 424-444.

Drees, J.M., & Heugens, P.P. (2013). Synthesizing and extending resource dependence theory: A meta-analysis. *Journal of management*, *39*(6), 1666-1698.

Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. *Academy of management review*, *14*(1), 57-74.

Faleye, O. (2007). Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment. *Journal of financial economics*, *83*(2), 501-529.

Ferguson, W.J. (2001). Performance in the boardroom: How should it be assessed?. *Real Estate Finance*, *17*(4), 49-56.

Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M. (2004). Context, behavior, and evolution: Challenges in research on boards and governance. *International Studies of Management & Organization*, *34*(2), 11-36.

Golden, B.R., & Zajac, E.J. (2001). When will boards influence strategy? Inclination× power= strategic change. *Strategic management journal*, *22*(12), 1087-1111.

Heller Jr, M.F. (1972). The board of directors: Legalistic anachronism or vital force. *California Management Review*, *14*(3), 24-30.

Hendry, K.P., Kiel, G.C., & Nicholson, G. (2010). How boards strategise: A strategy as practice view. *Long Range Planning*, *43*(1), 33-56.

Heracleous, L. (2001). What is the impact of corporate governance on organisational performance?. *Corporate governance: an international review*, *9*(3), 165-173.

Hillman, A.J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. *Academy of Management review*, *28*(3), 383-396.

Hoskisson, R.E., Hitt, M.A., Johnson, R.A., & Grossman, W. (2002). Conflicting voices: The effects of institutional ownership heterogeneity and internal governance on corporate innovation strategies. *Academy of Management journal*, *45*(4), 697-716.

Hung, H. (1998). A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards. *Corporate governance*, *6*(2), 101-111.

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11

Hung, H. (2011). Directors' roles in corporate social responsibility: A stakeholder perspective. *Journal of business ethics*, *103*, 385-402.

Hunt, E.K. (2016). *Property and Prophets: The evolution of economic institutions and ideologies: The evolution of economic institutions and ideologies*. Routledge.

Huse, M. (2005). Accountability and creating accountability: A framework for exploring behavioural perspectives of corporate governance. *British journal of management*, *16*, S65-S79.

Hussain, S., Ahmad, T., & Hassan, S. (2019). Corporate Governance and Firm performance using GMM. *International Journal of Information, Business and Management*, *11*(2), 300-316.

Ingley, C.B., & Van der Walt, N.T. (2001). The strategic board: The changing role of directors in developing and maintaining corporate capability. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, *9*(3), 174-185.

Ingley, C., & Van Der Walt, N. (2005). Do board processes influence director and board performance? Statutory and performance implications. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, *13*(5), 632-653.

Jensen, M., & Zajac, E.J. (2004). Corporate elites and corporate strategy: How demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm. *Strategic Management Journal*, *25*(6), 507-524.

Johnson, J.L., Daily, C.M., & Ellstrand, A.E. (1996). Boards of directors: A review and research agenda. *Journal of management*, *22*(3), 409-438.

Judge, W.Q. (2011). What level of analysis is most salient for a global theory of corporate governance?.

Kamardin, H., & Haron, H. (2011). Internal corporate governance and board performance in monitoring roles: Evidence from Malaysia. *Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting*, *9*(2), 119-140.

Kang, H., Cheng, M., & Gray, S.J. (2007). Corporate governance and board composition: Diversity and independence of Australian boards. *Corporate governance: An international review*, *15*(2), 194-207.

Kiel, G.C., & Nicholson, G.J. (2003). Board composition and corporate performance: How the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. *Corporate governance: an international review*, *11*(3), 189-205.

Kiel, G., & Beck, J. (2006). Seven steps to effective board and director evaluations. *Keeping Good Companies*, *58*(10), 588-592.

Leblanc, R. and Gillies, J. (2005), *Inside the boardroom*, Wiley and Sons, Toronto.

Leblanc, R., & Schwartz, M.S. (2007). The black box of board process: Gaining access to a difficult subject. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, *15*(5), 843-851.

Lok, J., Hwang, H., & Höllerer, M.A. (2016). "Managers to the Rescue!": Evaluating the Legacy of Stewardship Theory from an Institutional Perspective. In *Advancing organizational theory in a complex world* (pp. 134-149). Routledge.

Lückerath-Rovers, M. (2013). Women on boards and firm performance. *Journal of Management & Governance*, *17*, 491-509.

Twist, C. Directors: Myth and Reality. By Myles L. Mace. Boston, Mass.: Division of Research, Harvard University Graduate School of Busi-ness Administration, 1971. Pp. 207. $6.00.

Machin, J.L., & Wilson, L.S. (1979). Closing the gap between planning and control. *Long Range Planning*, *12*(2), 16-32.

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11

Machold, S., & Farquhar, S.S. (2013). Board task evolution: A longitudinal field study in the UK. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, *21*(2), 147-164.

Masulis, R.W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2007). Corporate governance and acquirer returns. *the Journal of Finance*, *62*(4), 1851-1889.

Melis, D.A., & Nijhof, A. (2018). The role of institutional investors in enacting stewardship by corporate boards. *Corporate Governance: the international journal of business in society*, *18*(4), 728-747.

Mizruchi, M.S. (1983). Who controls whom? An examination of the relation between management and boards of directors in large American corporations. *Academy of management Review*, *8*(3), 426-435.

Monks, R.& Minow, N. (2008) *Corporate Governance*, Wiley, London.

Muth, M., & Donaldson, L. (1998). Stewardship theory and board structure: A contingency approach. *Corporate Governance: An International Review*, *6*(1), 5-28.

Ngu, S.B., & Amran, A. (2018). Board diversity and materiality disclosure in sustainability reporting: A proposed conceptual framework. *International Academic Journal of Accounting and Financial Management*, *5*(4), 1-14.

Paniagua, J., Rivelles, R., & Sapena, J. (2018). Corporate governance and financial performance: The role of ownership and board structure. *Journal of Business Research*, *89*, 229-234.

Pavicevic, S., Haleblian, J.J., & Keil, T. (2018). 3. Periculum in Mora: Board Meeting Frequency and Timeliness, M&A Process and Acquisition Premium. *A Social-Psychological Perspective on Acquisitions: The Role of Individuals and Groups in Acquisition Decision Making Processes and Outcomes*, 82.

Pye, A., & Pettigrew, A. (2005). Studying board context, process and dynamics: Some challenges for the future. *British journal of management*, *16*, S27-S38.

Radomska, J. (2014). Linking the main obstacles to the strategy implementation with the company's performance. *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, *150*, 263-270.

Rao, K., & Tilt, C. (2016). Board composition and corporate social responsibility: The role of diversity, gender, strategy and decision making. *Journal of business ethics*, *138*, 327-347.

Rashid, A. (2015). Revisiting agency theory: Evidence of board independence and agency cost from Bangladesh. *Journal of business ethics*, *130*, 181-198.

Rubino, F., Giovanni, B., Mazzotta, R., Sicoli, G., Paolo, T., & Maurizio, R. (2016). Board Evaluation in Italian Listed Companies. In *Business Challenges in the Changing Economic Landscape-Vol. 1: Proceedings of the 14th Eurasia Business and Economics Society Conference* (pp. 89-114). Springer International Publishing.

Ruigrok, W., Peck, S. I., & Keller, H. (2006). Board characteristics and involvement in strategic decision making: Evidence from Swiss companies. *Journal of management Studies*, *43*(5), 1201-1226.

Sanchez, R., Galbreath, J., & Nicholson, G. (2017). Building sustainability competence from the top down: A model for researching and improving boards of directors' influence on firms' sustainability performance. In *Mid-range management theory: Competence perspectives on modularity and dynamic capabilities* (Vol. 8, pp. 69-107). Emerald Publishing Limited.

Shropshire, C. (2010). The role of the interlocking director and board receptivity in the diffusion of practices. *Academy of Management Review*, *35*(2), 246-264.

Stiles, P. (2001). The impact of the board on strategy: An empirical examination. *Journal of management studies*, *38*(5), 627-650.

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11

Stiles, P., & Taylor, B. (2001). *Boards at work: How directors view their roles and responsibilities: How directors view their roles and responsibilities*. OUP Oxford.

Sundaramurthy, C., & Lewis, M. (2003). Control and collaboration: Paradoxes of governance. *Academy of management review*, *28*(3), 397-415.

Thuraisingham, M. (2019). *Identity, power and influence in the boardroom: Actionable strategies for developing high impact directors and boards*. Routledge.

Wang, J., Chen, M.H., Fang, C.Y., & Tian, L. (2018). Does board size matter for Taiwanese hotel performance? Agency theory or resource dependence theory. *Cornell Hospitality Quarterly*, *59*(4), 317-324.

Yilmaz, C., & Buyuklu, A.H. (2016). Impacts of corporate governance on firm performance: Turkey case with a panel data analysis. *Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance*, *4*(1), 56-72.

Zahra, S.A., & Pearce, J.A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. *Journal of management*, *15*(2), 291-334.

Zhang, J. (2015). From market despotism to managerial hegemony: The rise of indigenous Chinese management. *Management and Organization Review*, *11*(2), 205-210.

Zhu, H., Wang, P., & Bart, C. (2016). Board processes, board strategic involvement, and organizational performance in for-profit and non-profit organizations. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *136*, 311-328.

Received: 01-Jul-2023, Manuscript No. ASMJ-23-13702; **Editor assigned:** 03-Jul-2023, PreQC No. ASMJ-23-13702 (PQ); **Reviewed:** 17-Jul-2023, QC No. ASMJ-23-13702; **Revised:** 21-Jul-2023, Manuscript No. ASMJ-23-13702 (R); **Published:** 28-Jul-2023

Citation Information: Agwu, E. (2023). The role of the boards in strategy development and execution in organizations. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 22(5), 1-11