Author(s): Bennett Becicka
In the event of a Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, medical experts (virologists, epidemiologists, public health scholars, and statisticians) will be crucial in recommending policies to stop the virus from spreading. Given the risk and scope of the outbreak, nearly no one has questioned the recommendations that these experts have made to policymakers. Frequently, the latter explicitly sought expert counsel and justified unpopular policies (such as restricting people's freedom of movement) by citing experts' epistemic authority. The major purpose of this research is to examine the foundations of this epistemic authority and the reasons why it has not been challenged in this case, despite the common trend in recent years to discount expertise. Furthermore, we find that, despite the fact that expert opinions are often technical and ostensibly unbiased, different experts have proposed diverse public health strategies throughout the COVID-19 problem. We look at the case of herd immunity in the United Kingdom and the exclusion of disabled persons from medical care in the United States. These judgments have significant axiological ramifications and have a dramatic impact on people in very sensitive areas. Another goal is to argue that in such cases, experts should justify their recommendations-which effectively become obligations-within the political process using the canons of public reason, because when values are involved, it is no longer just a matter of finding the "best technical solution" but also of making discretionary choices that affect citizens and cannot be imposed.