Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues (Print ISSN: 1544-0036; Online ISSN: 1544-0044)


Non-Delegation Doctrine of Presidential Legislative Power in the Presidential Government System: A Comparative Study between Indonesia and in the United States of America

Author(s): Charles Simabura

This study aims to discuss the doctrine of non-delegation with regard to the president's law-making power within a presidential government system. This normative study drawing on a comparative approach between both the Indonesian and the American systems of government, especially the law-making power of the president. Based on the 1945 Constitution, the Indonesian House of Representatives has the power to make laws. Every bill is deliberated by the House, together with the President, for joint approval. The bills may come from the House, the President, or the Regional Representative Council. In so setting, this constitutional provision places the law-making process in the hands of both the Legislative and the Executive. This study relies on the tex-based method to gather data consisting of constitutional provisions, laws, and regulations. The study shows that even though both Indonesia and America claim to practice the presidential system of government and the separation of powers, both countries have a different understanding of the source of legislation. In the latter, the law-making power is solely vested in the legislative with only veto power granted to the executive whereas, in the former, both the law-making power is shared by the legislative and the executive. The study also reveals that the power vested in the president to issue several types of laws and regulations When referring to the non-delegation doctrine, it is clear that the existence of the three forms of legislation is not in accordance with this doctrine and may cause several problems such as unclear limitations of the content of Government Regulations and Presidential Regulations.

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