Review Article: 2022 Vol: 25 Issue: 2S
Dudi Wahyudin, Universitas Padjadjaran
Arry Bainus, Universitas Padjadjaran
Widya Setiabudi Sumadinata R., Universitas Padjadjaran
Arfin Sudirman, Universitas Padjadjaran
Flight Information Region, Diplomacy, State Sovereignty, Air Sovereignty
Wahyudin, D., Bainus, A., Sumadinata, W., & Sudirman, A. (2022). Indonesian diplomacy against Singapore in acquisition of Flight Information Region (FIR). Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, 25(S2), 1-10.
FIR (Flight Information Region) arrangements basically aim to ensure flight safety, but these issues are closely related to political, economic, defense and security issues as well as air traffic control systems. One of the problems related to this FIR is the management or control of Indonesian airspace, some of which are still under the authority of Singapore's Air Traffic Control (ATC), namely the airspace in the Riau and Natuna Islands. This study aims to analyze the efforts made by Indonesia through persuasive actions in the form of diplomacy to take over the management of FIR from Singapore, especially during the administration of President Joko Widodo (2014 -2019). This research is a qualitative research by obtaining the validity and reliability of the data using the triangulation process. Interviews were conducted with informants related to the study of the urgency of FIR management in the West Indonesia region. This research resulted in an explanation of the Indonesian government's efforts in diplomacy through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy strategies. However, it seems less than optimal because there are differences in perception and understanding between State Institutions involved in the diplomacy process.
Based on the 1944 Chicago Convention, Indonesia has the right to regulate and manage its air space without intervention from other countries and no foreign aircraft will traverse without prior permission. So that every foreign aircraft that passes in Indonesian airspace must have a pass permit. The airspace of a country is part of the territory of the country which is an upward projection of the land area and territorial waters of a country.
With this authority, Indonesia has the right to secure its airspace for the benefit of state defense and security, aviation safety and economic management in its territory. The goal is to realize national development in all aspects of life. Geopolitically, Indonesia is located in a strategic location, which is between two continents and two oceans. This position has consequences for opportunities as well as challenges, and even threats for Indonesia in the future. Several things are still a problem as part of the consequences of Indonesia's position, one of which is related to the management of air space, especially aviation issues. The problem becomes more complex when faced with a dilemma, where Indonesia as an archipelagic country geographically has a large area but has limited resources in aspects of supervision or management.
As a form of sovereignty over its airspace, Indonesia also has the right to regulate flight traffic in its airspace, including providing information regarding flight areas based on flight safety considerations. In this context, the Flight Information Region (FIR) is defined. FIR is a service established to provide advice and useful information for the safety and efficiency of aviation traffic. Another purpose of the distribution of FIR is to ensure flight security and safety in accordance with ICAO provisions, where Indonesia has been a member of ICAO since 1950 and was ratified by Law No. 15 of 1992 and Law No. 1 of 2009 which refers to the Chicago Convention 1944 (Depanri, 2003).
One of the problems related to this FIR is the management or control of Indonesian airspace, which is partly still under the authority of Singapore's Air Traffic Control (ATC), namely the airspace in the Riau and Natuna Islands. This is based on an agreement between the Government of Indonesia and Singapore since 1995. The determination of the FIR under Singapore's control began with the ICAO forum in 1946. ICAO gave Singapore a mandate to manage the airspace around the Riau Islands and Natuna. In its implementation, it has caused many obstacles to Indonesian civil aviation, operations, and law enforcement which are carried out both by the National Air Defense Command and by the Indonesian Navy which carries out
Maritime Operations, because the control of air space is in Singapore’s Air Traffic Control
FIR management countries have obligations in Air Traffic Control, Flight Information Services, and altering services, where all three are accommodated in air services called Air Traffic Services which aim to prevent aircraft collisions in the air, provide advice and information related to flights, provide information if the aircraft is need help (AirNav Indonesia, 2018). In its implementation, the management of FIR is often in conflict with the issue of the sovereignty of a country's territorial boundaries which has the potential to become a source of conflict between countries. In fact, if we look at Article 1 of the 1944 Chicago.
Convention concerning International Civil Aviation it is stated that, “the contracting states recognize that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory” (ATS, 1984). This means that the sovereignty of the state regarding its air space is absolute and exclusive, or means the principle of absolute sovereignty for a country over its air space. However, violations of the airspace around the Riau and Natuna Islands often occur (Alfaris, 2014).
Another factor that gives an opportunity for a violation of sovereignty, namely the Military Training Areas (MTA) agreement between Indonesia and Singapore in September 1995. This agreement concerning military cooperation where Indonesia has a wide airspace authorizes Singapore to conduct military training. Singaporean warplanes often train on Bintan Island which is adjacent to Singapore on the grounds that the area is included in the MTA zone. In fact, the MTA agreement between the two countries ended in 2001 and was not renewed because Indonesia felt that it had suffered more than the gain. Another violation occurred in 2007 where Singapore once expelled civilian aircraft flying over Batam Island and the Anambas Islands which were categorized as dangerous areas. In the following year, the Singaporean military was recorded 18 times violating Indonesia's territorial boundaries, where Singapore often conducted military training in the airspace of the Riau Islands and Natuna without permission from Indonesia on the grounds that the FIR in the area was under Singapore's control. Meanwhile, based on data from Kohanudnas, in 2018 there were 38 violations of Indonesia's air sovereignty (Suhartono dkk, 2019).
To support this research, the researcher conducted several relevant previous studies, including research on the political implications of the ICAO's delegation of FIR for Riau and Natuna Islands to Singapore, which were reviewed by Supriyadi, et al., (2018); Silalahi, et al., (2015). The results of the study concluded that Singapore's management of the Indonesian territory's FIR has an influence on Indonesia's position in the international community so that the image that is built is Indonesia's inability to manage aviation areas.
A study on the efforts made by Indonesia to reorganize the management of FIR from Singapore to Indonesia which includes efforts in the diplomatic, regulatory and technical fields, consultations with Singapore, negotiations with Asia Pacific countries, and even the tendency to be resolved by litigation through the International Court of Justice has been carried out by Putra (2018); Paminto & Wahyudi (2016); Pramono (2012); Suhartono, et al., (2019). Researchers also conducted previous studies on Indonesian diplomacy in taking over FIR from Singapore, including Yelta & Lestari (2016); Dewi (2019) analyzes how Indonesia's diplomacy practices in resolving the Flight Information Region which is above the Riau and Natuna Islands from Singapore.
From 1946 to 2019, Singapore managed FIRs that were in the territory of Indonesia's sovereignty. There have been several attempts by Indonesia to take over control over the management of FIR from Singapore. Including preparing sufficient human resources and infrastructure to be able to manage FIR, bilateral negotiations with Singapore, to trilateral negotiations between Indonesia, Singapore and ICAO. However, until now the efforts made by Indonesia have not achieved the expected results. This has become a special interest for researchers to explore what and how Indonesia has done and the obstacles faced during the attempt to take over control of the FIR against Singapore, the reasons or reasons for the failure of Indonesian diplomacy in taking over the management of the FIR from Singapore over airspace control. Riau and Natuna islands, especially during the reign of President Joko Widodo (2014-2019).
The remainder of the present paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 contains the Literature Review used in this research. This is followed by Section 3, which explain the Research Method. In Chapter 4, the results of the Research and further discussed. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
In this section, the researcher will discuss the conceptual review in the study of International Relations that is relevant to the research discussion.
First Track Diplomacy
First Track Diplomacy is related to official diplomacy carried out between the governments of a country or the technique of a state action in its implementation. Basically, first-line diplomacy is a process where communication from a government is directly at the decision-making stage (Nye., 2011). According to De Magalhaes (1988), first track diplomacy can be used as an instrument of foreign policy as the establishment and development of relations between the government of one country and the government of another country by using an intermediary method that has been agreed upon by each party involved.
The main characteristic of first track diplomacy, which is one of the official and formal ways that occur at the state to state level. According to Berridges & James (2003), first track diplomacy is a form of business or mediation carried out by one or many countries as the main actor of diplomacy. Based on this, first track diplomacy can be carried out by official representatives assigned from state authorities in deciding to interact directly with other countries or with other state authorities such as the Head of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a country or other ministries. The first track diplomacy carried out by the Government of Indonesia in taking over FIR from Singapore was carried out in the context of sovereignty and optimization of Indonesia's economic resources.
In the conventional sense, Berridge (2001) asserts that both countries are in principle ready to conduct any business necessary by direct communication through representative officials. Diplomacy is rooted in reciprocity and the term 'bilateral' (literally means two sides) which emphasizes the fact that it can only exist through mutual participation. Contact is made through institutionalized communication channels, usually the foreign ministry and the respective diplomatic mission networks.
The scope of bilateral diplomacy includes Representation (Magalhães, 1988), Protection of Interests, Negotiations, Reporting and Information Gathering (VCDR, 1961). Within the scope of protection of interests, protection can take the form of public interests and public services, security interests, ethical and political interests, economic interests and a major interest, namely development. The state maintains resident diplomatic missions in various other countries based on the view that these institutions protect and pursue interests that cannot be delegated on an ad hoc basis to other institutions. Protecting and promoting the interests of one's own citizens is not limited to consular services, and bilateral embassies can have a broader and community-building role regarding their citizens living in the host country (Dahya, 2015).
In this research, bilateral diplomacy is used as a conceptual framework to explain the phenomenon of Indonesia's diplomatic efforts against Singapore in taking over the flight information region in the Riau and Natuna Islands. Indonesia carries out bilateral diplomacy towards Singapore, both covering the purpose of protecting Indonesia's interests, especially those related to public services, security and economic interests, as well as political and development interests. Indonesia's bilateral diplomacy towards Singapore through negotiations and information gathering by not forgetting the development and promotion of relations between the two countries.
The concept of multilateral diplomacy implies that there are rules of engagement regulated in law based on the need for coordination of diplomatic responses to international issues. Multilateral diplomacy can be interpreted as the practice of diplomacy involving more than two countries, especially between countries that have the same interests and desire to achieve them (Freeman, 2018).
With the involvement of countries in diplomacy, the formulated policies are able to create strong legitimacy so that finding solutions to global problems is not just a mere formality. In addition, multilateral agreements resulting from parliamentary diplomacy or conference diplomacy bring other benefits, namely from the aspect of lower transaction 'costs' in a centralized negotiation and the formulation process brings binding decisions for all parties involved to implement each other's agreements (Bjola & Kornprobst, 2018).
In this research, the multilateral diplomacy framework is used by researchers to observe and analyze Indonesia's position in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and a reflection for reviewing Singapore's position in ICAO. The efforts made by Indonesia to take over FIR from Singapore cannot be separated from the context of Indonesia's multilateral diplomacy in its membership in ICAO.
According to Stephen D. Krasner international regimes are the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, both implicit and explicit, by which the expectations of international actors meet in a particular area of international relations (Krasner, 1982). Principles can be understood as belief in a fact, cause, effect, and morality in action. Norms on the other hand are standards of behavior that can be seen through rights and obligations. Rules are specific methods that become directions or a standard for action. Meanwhile, decision making procedures are the practices used in making and implementing collective decisions.
International regimes can also be interpreted as regularities about behavior, principles, norms or rules that exist in each substantive specific issue in international relations whose function is to regulate, limit and even force its members to behave in accordance with the agreements that have been reached (Puchala & Hopkins, 1982).
In this research, the researcher uses international regime theory to see ICAO as a regime regarding international civil aviation that regulates flight routes, which in this research is related to regulations regarding FIR. The division of the FIR area is carried out by ICAO in order to ensure world aviation security or safety. Therefore, Indonesia's diplomacy regarding FIR against Singapore cannot be separated from its relationship with ICAO as an international regime regarding civil aviation in the world.
The research method used in this study is a qualitative research method. In this study, the unit of analysis used by the researcher is the state system, namely Indonesia, which relates to the efforts made through its diplomacy towards Singapore. To obtain the validity and reliability of the data, the researcher used a triangulation process. The process of data triangulation, which uses various data sources such as documents, archives, and the results of interviews with more than one subject who are considered to have different points of view.
In the process of collecting the data, the researcher attempted to obtain data through interviews with relevant sources in this study. Researchers also collected various kinds of documents through books, journals, theses, newspapers, government publications, and official documents related to diplomacy carried out by Indonesia against Singapore regarding the takeover of the FIR of the Natuna and Riau islands.
Interviews were conducted on information related to the study of the urgency of West Indonesia's FIR management within the framework of Sovereignty in the National Airspace, including:
1) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia
2) Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia
3) Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia
4) Air Force Headquarters
6) Academics/observers in the field of air security and defense.
Sovereignty and Security of Indonesian Airspace
Each country has full and exclusive sovereignty over the air space that is above its territory, the recognition is confirmed in the Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944 (Chicago Convention, 1944). With its sovereignty, no aircraft belonging to the government of a country may pass through the airspace of another country without permission, if that is done then the country concerned has the right to take legal steps that are firm in nature to secure its airspace. The recognized Indonesian airspace is the air above the land, the waters of the archipelago, and the Indonesian territorial sea, the total of which is 5.297.027 km2.
The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia perceives that Dirgantara is understood as the space above the earth's surface and the natural objects contained in it, and starts from air space to include space that rises and expands without limits. This perception is built on the basis of the international dimension of aerospace, where this dimension consists of Air Space as a sovereign area and Outer Space as an area of international interest. However, it is true that there is no definite provision for the Vertical Delimitation of Airspace, which ranges from 110-130 km (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2020).
However, Simanjuntak (2020) considers the connection between the management of FIR with nationalism and air sovereignty as a wrong thing, although that is understandable. According to him, FIR does not recognize sovereignty, although this technical issue is always seen from the perspective of sovereignty. With this point of view, the public is then distorted that when there is a small part of the management of Indonesian airspace which is managed by Singapore's FIR, there is an impression that Indonesia's air sovereignty is being disturbed. As a matter of thought, the FIR issue does not always intersect with state sovereignty is the enactment of the ICAO regulation which stipulates that the Makassar FIR controls air traffic in Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste and the Jakarta FIR regulates the Christmas Island (Australia) FIR. This means that Australian aircraft that will fly from Sydney to Christmas Island must first report to Indonesia (Simanjuntak, 2020).
Subarkah (2019) has a different view, according to him it is clear that the takeover of control of Indonesian airspace from Singapore's FIR relates to two aspects, namely national interests and sovereignty. The problem can not only be seen from how Indonesian aircraft (civil and military) must report their activities to ATC Singapore but also Indonesia must pay to Singapore when an Indonesian aircraft crosses Singapore's control area, even though the air sovereignty of the area is part of Indonesian airspace (Subarkah, 2019).
Meanwhile, according to the Indonesian Air Force and the Indonesian government, although ICAO in Annex 11 states that FIR is not related to air sovereignty, they say that the FIR area controlled by Singapore in Riau's airspace is causing Indonesia problems. Especially for the air force when conducting operations or training. Several Indonesian Air Force officials said that their pilots had to get permission from Changi ATC before starting the engine, which was also an important issue regarding the designation of a danger zone by Singapore on the grounds that the violation of Singapore's navy was considered a violation of international law, because some of its territory is a Indonesian territory. In addition, if the Singapore Navy trains, other aircraft will be diverted for actual firearms reasons, so the aircraft will have to rotate, and this is inefficient. The continuous use of the Military Training Area (MTA) is also another reason for the takeover, it can be considered a violation of Indonesia's sovereign territory.
Flight Information Region (FIR) Management and Challenges of Taking FIRs from Singapore
Although Indonesia already has two FIRs, Jakarta FIR and Ujung Pandang FIR, although there are still Indonesian strategic airspaces which are actually under the management of Singapore's FIR (Jatmiko, 2019). Based on the results of the meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in March 1964 in Dublin, Ireland, it was stated that the Flight Information Region (FIR) of Indonesia's airspace of 100 nautical miles or 1,825 kilometers was controlled by another country. FIR controlled airspace includes Block A, Block B, and Block C (Subarkah, 2019).
1) Block A covers over 8 kilometers along Batam and Singapore;
2) Block B covers Tanjung Pinang and Karimun; and
3) Block C covers the Natuna airspace controlled by Singapore above 24,500 feet, and Malaysia below 24,500 feet.
The handover of airspace management from Singapore to Indonesia is important for national security, because with Singapore still managing Indonesian air traffic in the Batam and Riau Islands region, Singapore can find out about civil and military aviation activities, even Singapore is also able to identify potential Indonesia's economic revenue from the aviation sector. With these problems, it can be said that Indonesia's airspace is not fully sovereign.
Along with the development of technological capabilities, especially air transportation, it is only natural that the Indonesian government encourages the management of its own airspace by the domestic air authority. In terms of hardware and software owned, air transportation already has sufficient capabilities, this can be proven by the excellent ability to regulate air traffic in Jakarta's FIR. In the Jakarta FIR area, the amount of traffic is much larger than the Singapore FIR for sectors A, B, C. So that it can provide an illustration that from a technical operational perspective, Indonesia's capabilities cannot be doubted.
For human resources, Indonesia is required to continue to make efforts to improve. For example, to support this re-alignment, various airports need a Senior Air Traffic Controller (ATC). The placement of the best ATC is absolutely necessary so that the spirit of re-alignment is also balanced with Indonesia's ability to manage heavy international air traffic. So that the increase and addition of human resources in large numbers must be carried out in the shortest possible time (Jatmiko, 2019).
Indonesia's efforts to take over the management of its airspace in Blocks A, B, and C also have challenges, because Indonesia is required to be able to balance Singapore's airspace management capabilities for the surrounding airspace which has a status of 0 (zero) accident. Indonesia is demanded by ICAO to be able to balance or equalize its facilities and infrastructure as Singapore. Meanwhile, Singapore itself with a high flight load continues to strive to develop their technology and FIR management in order to maintain a zero accident status (AA Supriyadi et al., 2020). This situation is certainly a challenge for Indonesia, because the government must focus on the development of facilities and infrastructure to support the management of FIR, therefore in addition to that, it is also necessary to have a grand plan, tactics and operational strategy to be able to take over the management of FIR from Singapore.
Efforts to complete the re-management of Indonesian airspace from Singapore's FIR became an important issue after the agreement between President Joko Widodo and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in 2019. Indonesia itself was assessed by the Deputy for Maritime Sovereignty and Energy Coordination as having the capacity, ability to manage airspace throughout Indonesia, therefore there is no reason to achieve this FIR target to be taken immediately.
FIR Takeover Process from Singapore
The process for taking back airspace management in Blocks A, B, and C has long been carried out by the Indonesian government, efforts to take over the management of airspace over the Natuna Islands and Riau Islands from Singapore have been recorded since 1983, although sometimes these efforts encounter obstacles or even rejected because Indonesia is considered unable to manage the airspace, both in terms of technology, organization, and human resources. Some of the efforts that have been taken by the Indonesian government include:
1) Establishing a Public Company for Aviation Navigation Service Providers (LPPNPI). The purpose of the establishment of LPPNPI is to provide good flight navigation services throughout Indonesia. So far, in Indonesia itself, there are 2 air spaces, each of which is managed by PT. Angkasa Pura 1, namely Makassar Air Traffic Service Center (MATSC), and PT. Angkasa Pura 2, namely the Jakarta Air Traffic Service Center (JATSC), each of which has different standards. With the existence of LPPNPI, it is hoped that services will have the same standards and can be better with management through LPPNPI (Fahrazi, 2019).
2) Indonesia has also attempted to join the International Civil Aviation Council (ICAO) in 2016. If Indonesia wants to apply for FIR re-alignment, Indonesia's efforts to take over Aviation Navigation Services at the ICAO Level are based on the Air Navigation Plan regulation in the ratification of the Regional Planning and Implementation session. Regional Groups require prior approval from other ICAO member countries. Indonesia and Singapore had submitted a joint latter proposal to ICAO to be discussed in the session. However, in the end, the proposal has not been able to receive approval from ICAO due to objections submitted by the Malaysian side, in which, if Indonesia is able to manage the areas previously delegated to Singapore, namely Blocks A, B, C, this would be considered unfavorable to Malaysia, especially in Block B due to the right of access to flights from West Malaysia to East Malaysia and vice versa.
3) Cooperates with AirNav Indonesia and The MITER Corporation. This collaboration encourages the existence of a program in terms of modernization of flight navigation tools
4) In Indonesia, which is named the Indonesia Modernization of Air Navigation Services (IMANS). This program was launched to improve the flight navigation system in Indonesia. The MITER will be an Indonesian consultant in modernizing navigation services throughout Indonesia. This collaboration between AirNav and The MITER includes activities in the field of aviation safety and security, modernization of aviation navigation systems, development and improvement of flight support services and capacity analysis, as well as development and planning of airspace and airports.
5) The framework for negotiating FIR management between Indonesia and Singapore, although it is one of the focuses of the Joko Widodo government's work program, also continues to consider various aspects in the restructuring of the FIR takeover program. To minimize the negative impact that may arise from the takeover of the management of the FIR, on October 7, 2019 the technical teams of the two countries met.
The technical work that has been carried out by the Indonesian government includes the plan to build a military base in Natuna in an effort to defend the border area. The master plan for the construction of a military base includes plans to equip it with a variety of super-advanced combat equipment. The Indonesian government itself has shown the importance of strengthening the country's defense and security system (Supriyadi et al., 2020).
Positive things that can be obtained by Indonesia if it succeeds in taking over the FIR area from Singapore include:
1) Additional income from the regulation of civil aviation services, as well as other economic stimulation resulting from the management of FIR in the area;
2) Indonesian airlines can take an economical route when crossing the airspace;
3) Domestic flights through the said airspace do not need to obtain a permit from the Singaporean authorities;
4) Indonesian Air Force aircraft that have special missions in the airspace do not need to obtain prior permission from the Singaporean authorities;
5) Indonesia can be proud, because it can prove its ability to the international community in managing and defending its own airspace;
6) The Indonesian government can fulfill its responsibilities under Law no. 1 of 2009 which explains that FIR management must be managed by Indonesia, no later than 15 years after it has been legalized or in 2024 to be precise.
Differences in Perceptions between State Institutions in the Management of FIR
Based on the research in the field, there are differences in the internal perception of each stakeholder who takes a role in this task. The team formed to deal with this problem consists of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment. Many institutions involved in addressing this issue have caused separate polemics within the Indonesian government, including various perceptions related to professionalism in civil aviation, issues of sovereignty, and issues of national interest.
The lack of understanding between government institutions in responding to the president's instructions regarding the takeover of FIR from Singapore makes the attitude or priority scale of each institution different. Whereas according to Atip Latipulayat in Gunawan (2020) he argues that Singapore does not have a strong position in negotiating the takeover of the Riau Islands and Natuna FIRs.
For example, related to the issue of sovereignty, in principle, cooperative or diplomatic relations should not harm national interests, especially national defense. Although FIR aims to deal with technical issues in ensuring flight safety, it is closely related to other aspects, be it politics, economy, defense, and security. Delegating the management of FIR to Singapore should not reduce Indonesia's sovereignty, despite the fact that it is contradictory, even threatening Indonesia's sovereignty. The legal provision which states that the delegation of air traffic management to other countries does not reduce sovereignty, but this is very vulnerable to abuse, so that the country that delegates it can suffer losses.
The management of the FIR is not a question of sovereignty, but the problem is who will be responsible if this authority is misused and facilitates military access to carry out certain missions. In general, informants from the Ministry of Defense stated that FIR was closely related to the issue of sovereignty, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Transportation had another perspective that FIR was a delegation of technical affairs to ensure air traffic safety services.
This is certainly not profitable in Indonesia's diplomatic strategy, both in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Differences in perceptions of Indonesia's interests in taking over the Riau Islands and Natuna FIRs, as well as different responses to the abuse of authority of the FIRs are serious problems for the Indonesian government. In principle, an understanding needs to be built, so that there is a common perception in carrying out the President's instructions regarding the takeover of the FIR. In addition, these differences in perception can disrupt the process of technical discussions, both in the bilateral context between Indonesia and Singapore, as well as in multilateral matters.
Based on that explanation, the difference in perception becomes a big criticism for Indonesia's diplomatic strategy, especially during the Joko Widodo administration. In terms of building agreements bilaterally or multilaterally in discussing the FIR, Indonesia is still busy with the different perceptions of the leaders of the institutions assigned to deal with these problems. Thus, one of the ideas in this research is the importance of the state's internal readiness in diplomacy, especially in formulating any ideas that will be discussed, so that it is hoped that the interests of the state can be achieved.
During the 2014-2019 Joko Widodo administration, several diplomatic efforts were made to take over the management of FIR in the Riau and Natuna Islands from Singapore, diplomacy was carried out through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy strategies. In the bilateral diplomacy process, discussions on the takeover of the FIR from Singapore have been carried out several times, but before 2019 the results have not been in Indonesia's favor, because Indonesia is seen as incapable of managing the FIR, both in terms of human resources and infrastructure. Then the diplomatic agenda that was rebuilt by the Joko Widodo government, when receiving a visit from the Singapore Foreign Minister, which included discussing the issue of FIR. This diplomatic process provides a progress in the process of taking over the FIR with the establishment of an agreement on the Framework for Negotiation of FIR Realignment on 12 September 2019.
To conclude, the diplomatic process is an important thing, but the diplomatic process also needs to be supported by the existence of a common perception and understanding between institutions, the aim is that the process of taking over the FIR from Singapore can run well. However, a problem arose in the form of a separate polemic within the Indonesian government. Among them are various perceptions related to professionalism in civil aviation, issues of sovereignty, and issues of national interest. The lack of understanding between institutions or not one voice between government agencies in responding to and responding to the president's instructions regarding the takeover of FIR from Singapore makes the attitude or priority scale of each institution different. This does not benefit Indonesia and hinders Indonesia's diplomatic strategy that has been launched.
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Received: 24-Jan-2022, Manuscript No. jleri-21-9477; Editor assigned: 27-Jan-2022, PreQC No jleri-21-9477 (PQ); Reviewed: 15- Feb-2022, QC No. jleri-21-9477; Revised: 24-Feb-2022, Manuscript No. jleri-21-9477 (R); Published: 10-Mar-2022.