Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues (Print ISSN: 1544-0036; Online ISSN: 1544-0044)

Research Article: 2021 Vol: 24 Issue: 2

The Role of Non-State Actors in Deradicalization Program as Part of Collaboration in Terrorism Mitigation in Indonesia

Stanislaus Riyanta, University of Indonesia

Amy Y.S. Rahayu, University of Indonesia

Benny J. Mamoto, University of Indonesia

Abstract

The role of non-state actors in deradicalization program as part of collaboration in terrorism mitigation in Indonesia As the main cause of terrorism, radicalism has infected so many people from various backgrounds in Indonesia, including those who used to be invulnerable to the penetration of radicalization. Around 20% of ex-convicts of terrorism have committed terrorism violence although they have participated in deradicalization program. In order to mitigate this issue, one of the non-state actors that should be involved in deradicalization program is academicians. Unfortunately, there has not been any comprehensive collaboration that involves academicians in the deradicalization program. Therefore, in this study, the perspectives and experiences of academicians toward deradicalization and the prevention of terrorism in Indonesia will be elaborated. From the results of the perspective analysis, which include the opinions of the exconvicts of terrorism and the National Board of Counterterrorism as the Government representative, a collaboration model that fits into the deradicalization program in Indonesia can be designed. Therefore, it is expected that a collaboration model between academicians and the government in the implementation of deradicalization program in Indonesia can be proposed.

Keywords

Terrorism, Mitigation, Deradicalization, Collaboration.

Introduction

Terrorism has been a serious problem in many countries all around the globe, including Indonesia (Hudson & Marilyn,1999). A number of terror actions have been taking place throughout Indonesia since the New Order era until the Reformation era. At the same time, Indonesia has been a nest for the sleeping cells of terrorists, which has been quite concerning. The Chief of Indonesian National Police, Tito Karnavian, in the Middle East Special Operation Commanders Conference (MESOC) mentioned that there are 2,000 militants who have been the alumni of Afghanistan and the Philippines. This statement was confirmed by an expert of terrorism, Bruce Hoffman, who stated that there have been approximately 3,000 members of Al-Qaeda members in Indonesia and this figure has not included the supporters, sympathizers, and followers of ISIS. These sleeping cells live like ordinary people in the community at the moment, but they will move when they find the right moment and trigger (Hoffman, 2006).

In relation to terrorism and with reference to the above statement, radicalism has penetrated the state apparatus that have once been considered impenetrable. There are several incidents that confirm the statement. First, in 2015, a member of Batanghari Resort Police Department, Brigadier Syahputra, joined ISIS in Syria. Then, in May 2019, a policewoman was arrested at Juanda Airport for leaving her post in the North Moluccas Regional Police Department. The policewoman was found to leave her post because she had been exposed to radicalism. Furthermore, in 2010, three state apparatus officers who had been alumni of the Institute of Domestic Governance were arrested in Aceh because of their involvement in the act of terrorism (Okenews, 2010). This is surprising because the education in the Institute is semi-military with high indoctrination of discipline and nationalism (Ali, 2015).

This issue becomes more worrying since there have been cases where state apparatus are involved in radicalism, for example:

1. State apparatus officers from the State Polytechnic Banyuwangi (Detik, 2017 & 2018);

2. State apparatus from the Office of Agriculture the Regency of Probolinggo Government;

3. A teacher in the City of Probolinggo.

Radicalism seems to have also penetrated the state servants in ministries. For example, the husband of a state apparatus officer who has been working in the Regional Office of the Ministry of Religion Affairs East Java was shot to dead by Special Detachment 88 due to his involvement in the act of terrorism.  In 2016, a state apparatus officer from the Ministry of Finance, who was a graduate of the State Accounting Academic and a Graduate Program of Public Policy from Australia, resigned and was found to be deported from Turkey due to his intention of joining ISIS in Syria11. Last, radicalism has also influenced an official of Batam Enterprise Board. This official migrated (hijrah) to Syria with his family to join ISIS. Although he felt sorry because his decision did not meet his expectation, the ex-official of Batam Enterprise Board and his family were still lucky because they could return to Indonesia; however, all of them should undergo the legal proceedings.

In addition to the above contexts, radicalism has also taken place in private sectors. On December 23rd, 2015, an employee of a big automotive company in Indonesia was arrested by the Special Detachment 88 because of the involvement in the act of terrorism. Later, it was found that the employee had been one of the confidants of an ISIS high-ranking official in the Middle East. This fact has made people aware that all parties in the private sectors should not underestimate the influence of radicalism. At the same time, radicalism has also influenced educational institutions and this finding is important to highlight. The educational institutions that have been exposed to radicalism include higher education institutions until childhood education institution (National Counterterrorism Agency, 2013). According to the Soufan Centre, a trustworthy organization in the domain of intelligence and terrorism, there are more than 600 Indonesian citizens who have joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria and these 600 Indonesian citizens comprise of 113 females and 100 children while the remaining citizens are males. In the report (which has been updated in March 2017), it is found that 50 people have returned to Indonesia and 384 people still stay in Iraq and Syria while the rest are unknown (Barrett, 2017).

In Indonesia, radicalism has evolved and manifested into the act of terror. This statement is confirmed by a sequence of terror attacks that took place in Surabaya in May 2018. These attacks prove that a new model of terrorism acts has appeared for the very first time in Indonesia. Suicide bombing as an act of terror that involved a core family has been recorded for the very first time in the country. In addition, the attack to the Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law, and Security Wiranto in October 2019 was also perpetrated by a couple of husband and wife (Bisnis, 2019).

The involvement of a core family in a single act of terror, especially the one using suicide bombing, should be given an in-depth review. The reason is that the new model is difficult to perform and requires special conditions. One of the special conditions is the indoctrinated ideology which has been so strong that the core family might perpetrate the act of terrorism by committing suicide bombing. The use of suicide bombing is quite surprising and uncommon in the history of terror acts by radical groups, especially the Islam-based ones. The Islamic radical organizations such as Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah which have perpetrated numerous acts of terror from the era of New Order until 2013, have never recruited women and children. This principle is clearly stated in the General Guidelines for the Struggle of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah in the Section of An-Nidhomul-Asasiy, or a set of regulations that have been formulated in order to establish order among the pilgrims, by asserting that an individual is allowed to be part of the pilgrims after the individual has reached the puberty period (Chapter X Membership Article 30 letter e) (Anonim, 1996).

In addition to the fact that the radical group has developed and has even violated the norms that have been laid down, it has also been able to adapt the act of terrors. This adaptation is proven to surpass the regulations that have been made by the predecessors of the radical group. This kind of situation indeed becomes one of the factors underlying the dispute between the radical groups, including the dispute between the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah and the ISIS (Rochmat & Fathoni, 2017).

On the other hand, in relation to the act of terrorism, some of the terror perpetrators are the ex-convicts of terrorism who used to join the deradicalization program. The Head of the National Board of Counterterrorism the Police General Commissioner Suhardi Aliyus (October 11th, 2016) stated that 20% of the convicts of terrorism have become terrorists again after they have been released from correctional institutions although these convicts of terrorism have attended the deradicalization program that has been designed to change the paradigm of the convicts of terrorism (Purnama, 2016).

With regard to the above situation, Shodiq (2018) mentioned some facts about the weak prevention of radicalism and terrorism. In his opinion, the law enforcement that the government has implemented to the terror perpetrators does not guarantee the decreasing rate of the terrors that has taken place in Indonesia. Since 2000 until 2018, approximately 1,799 people have become terrorism perpetrators and 906 perpetrators have been sentenced and released from correctional institutions while 52 perpetrators committed the same act of terrorism after having been released.

On this basis, it is important that radicalism should be given main attention within the efforts of terrorism mitigation in Indonesia. Therefore, this study focuses on confirming that the involvement of non-state actors is useful for mitigating the act of terrorism since they are more welcomed by the convicts of terrorism. Then, the non-state actors that will be discussed throughout the study is the academician because academicians who have been considered neutral within the deradicalization program.

Literature Review

In this section, there are two aspects that become the object of attention. The first aspect is deradicalization, while the second one is collaborative governance. In reviewing both aspects, it is assumed that the collaborative governance model will fit into the collaboration between academicians and the government within the deradicalization program in Indonesia. Thus, in order to support the assumption, the theories are reviewed in the next sections.

Radicalization and De-radicalization

Prior to dealing with the concept of deradicalization, the idea of radicalization should be given sufficient explanation. Indeed, radicalization has been a major problem throughout the history. In the past, the concept of radicalization had been related to the left movement as a response to the increasing capital influence throughout Europe. However, the concept of radicalization has been related to Islamic extremism as marked by several terrorist violence, notably the 9/11 case. Indeed, the situation is related to the fact that people who have perpetrated violent terrorism are from the larger group of extremists who share an ideology that inspires their actions. With reference to the statement, in the context of Indonesia, radicalization has been strongly related to the Islamic extremist view, especially in relation to the dissemination of the Khalifa concept among the Moslem Indonesians.

According to Hikam, radicalization can be defined as the process of turning and/or changing both individuals and groups into radicals. In a more specific manner, radicalization can be defined as follows. an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either:

1. The use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion,

2. Various forms of political violence other than terrorism or

3. Acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes.

The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate (Kundnani, 2015; Schmid, 2013).

Based on the definition, radicalization serves as a particular model that explains the causes of terrorism and is understood as a process in which the extremist ideas have been propagated and disseminated by key activists and thinkers who radicalise others due to the others’ vulnerabilities to such message (Coppock & McGovern, 2014). A clear example of this situation can be found in the stabbing of a soldier named Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London, on May 2013. In this case, it seems that the two perpetrators, namely Michael Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo, were suspected to have been radicalised by an adverse influence of the “hate” preachers such as Anjem Choudhary.

In relation to the above description of radicalization, there are four factors that can be attributed to radicalization vulnerability within a community namely:

1. Identity crisis;

2. Personal crisis;

3. Personal circumstances;

4. Unemployment/underemployment and criminality (Heath-Kelly, 2017; Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2019).

The identify crisis usually takes place among adolescents or vulnerable adults who feel distant from both their parents and also from their cultural and religious heritage; this situation can be worse when these adolescents or vulnerable adults are uncomfortable with their position in the society especially for immigrants in the case of the Western world. Following the identify crisis, the personal crisis and the personal circumstances can appear together at the same time.  Both the personal crisis and the personal circumstances can be caused by the experience of migration, local tensions, and events that affect families in the countries of origin, causing the members of these families to alienate themselves from the countries of current residence and to take actions that can harm the symbols of the community or the state of the current residence. In addition to these four factors, a number of things can also be attributed to the reasons why people have been radicalized and these things can be explained as follows.

1. Most terrorists are clinically normal although their acts are considered widely as extra-normal in moral terms;

2. The backgrounds of terrorists are very diverse; there are many paths to terrorism and there is no single profile of a terrorist;

3. Radicalization is usually a gradual, phased process;

4. Individual poverty alone does not cause radicalization towards terrorism but un(der)employment may play a role;

5. Grievances play a role but often more as a mobilization device than as a personal experience;

6. Social networks/environments are crucial in drawing vulnerable youths to a terrorist movement;

7. Ideology often plays an important role in that it can provide the true believer with a ‘license to kill’;

8. Disengagement from terrorism often occurs without de-radicalization.

When the above descriptions are put in the context of Indonesia, it is clear that through radicalization the terrorists, who have been pious Moslem Indonesians, have been turned into the agents of the struggle for Khalifa implementation. This situation is completely dangerous for Indonesia since Indonesia has been known for its high tolerance among the people. Therefore, to counter the situation, the concept of deradicalization should be introduced and the efforts of pursuing deradicalization especially among the ex-terrorists should be made. In brief, deradicalization refers to the efforts of discontinuing, eliminating, or at least neutralizing radicalism. In the context counterterrorism, at the beginning, deradicalization is intended to serve as an effort of persuading the terrorists and their supporters to leave the use of violence (Hikam, 2020) In order to accommodate this idea, several initiatives can be used. For example, the Australian Government has implemented the resilience approach which promotes three aspects, namely democratic values, social harmony, and active participation within the Moslem communities. Indeed, these aspects should be emphasized in the deradicalization effort and, moreover, in the prevention of extremism since local communities, prevention, community cohesion, and resilience play significant roles in deradicalization (Aly, 2015; Berczyk & Vermeulen, 2015).

The ideas that have been previously mentioned should be considered although the situation is different because, unlike in the West, especially in Europe, where Moslems have been the minority, in Indonesia Moslems has been the majority and yet the nation is still struggling to maintain the harmony within. Furthermore, in Indonesia deradicalization has been developed not only in the form of understanding but also in the counter-ideology initiative or de-ideologization. Pursuing deradicalization in this vein is highly important because, specifically in the context of Indonesia, extremism as the root of radicalization and radicalism has been the perversion of the Islam’s messages since the basis of terrorism is not the Islamic texts but the twentieth century’s Islamic ideologues who reinterpret the Islam’s essentially benign teachings based on the model of communism and fascism, such as the ones depicted by the violence of Al-Qaeda and even ISIS.

Thus, it is expected that deradicalization will be able to perform early prevention toward the influence of radical ideology and therefore deradicalization should be implemented not only among the supporters of terrorism movement, the ex-terrorism perpetrators, and the convicts of terrorism but also in the civil society organizations that have strategic positions. In line with the statement, deradicalization program refers to the program of early prevention that should be widely implemented in the society. The statement certainly describes that the deradicalization program should be implemented as part of long-term policy.

Considering its significance, especially in relation to counterterrorism efforts and initiatives, deradicalization becomes popular in the counterterrorism cycle. Due to this popularity, deradicalization might be defined as a counselling process that aims at modifying the interpretation of religious scripts such as holy books, disengaging an individual from certain jihadi groups, or supporting the rehabilitation and the reintegration of ex-convict of terrorism into the society (International Crisis Group, 2007).

Collaborative Governance

Collaborative governance refers to a structured process within the management of public policy formulation that constructively involves actors from multiple levels. These actors might come from the government, public institutions, private institutions, and the civil society. The objective of collaborative governance is to achieve the public objective that requires concerted efforts. Collaborative governance is not solely limited to the formal and state-established governance. According to (Emerson, 2011) collaborative governance serves as the decision making and public policy management process and structure that engage the society to constructively cross the boundaries of the public institution, the government level, and/or the state, the private, and the public environment in order to achieve the public objectives that demand concerted efforts.

Collaborative governance is not only limited to the formal and state-defined contexts. Still according to Emerson et al., collaborative governance is defined as the decision-making process and structure and also the public policy management that constructively involves the people from various public institutions, government level, and/or public, private, and state administrative environment in order to achieve the public objectives under the single means. The concept of collaborative governance entails the community-based collaborative, which altogether run the resource management, and the inter-governmental collaborative. Thus, the definition of collaborative governance might be applied or utilized in explaining the participatory governance and the civic engagement.

In relation to collaborative governance, there are several initiatives that can be implemented. The first initiative comes from ARIS, which stands for the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). ARIS consists of 7-point Likert-scale ranging from 1=disagree completely to 4=neutral and eventually to 7=agree completely. The intention of using this scale is to identify the intentions that have been related to political behaviour. Then, the second initiative comes from the joint collaboration between the English Government and the NHS through a program known as Prevent Strategy. In this Prevent Strategy, the marginalised communities, especially the Moslem ones, are not seen as a site of suspects but instead as a group that should be empowered so that these communities will be resilient to violent extremism. Then, in relation to this kind of collaboration, a theoretical framework known as Social Movement Theory can be introduced (Borum, 2011). According to this theory, social movement can be defined as a set of opinions and beliefs within a population that represent the preferences for changing some elements of the social structures and/or reward distribution of a society. Departing from the statement, in order to survive a social movement should perform the following tasks:

1. Forming mobilization potential;

2. Forming and motivating recruitment networks;

3. Arousing motivation to participate;

4. Removing barriers to participation.

By paying attention to the two examples above and the theoretical framework, it can be expected that efforts of collaborative governance for the Indonesian context can be executed. In turn, the collaborative governance initiative can be put into action significantly. In general, the collaborative governance initiative consists of three components. The first component deals with the collaboration dynamics, which consist of principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action. Then, the second component deals with the actions in collaboration. Eventually, the third component deals with the impacts and adaptation for collaborative dynamics.

Methodology

This study employed qualitative method. It was conducted in Indonesia. The primary data were gathered from interviews with the academicians as the subjects of the study. The objective of interviewing these academicians was to attain their views about terrorism and deradicalization in Indonesia. After the interviews with the academicians had been completed, another session of interview was held with the government, represented by the official of the National Board of Counterterrorism as the leading sector in the counterterrorism initiative. Furthermore, an interview was also held with the ex-convicts of terrorism who used to attend the deradicalization program. In addition to data from the primary sources, data for the study were also gathered from secondary sources, which are relevant documents. Last, the analysis technique adopted in the study was the descriptive qualitative technique.

Discussion

When serving his duty as the Head of the National Board of Counterterrorism, Tito Karnavian explains that there are three stages of counterterrorism namely prevention, law enforcement, and post-law enforcement rehabilitation. In addition, Karnavian also explains that the most important domain lies in the stage of prevention and the state of rehabilitation. As a result, Karnavian has assessed that there should be inter-institutional coordination in order to implement the three stages. Furthermore, Karnavian suggests that the implementation of the three stages is impossible to be assigned onto the hands of a single institution (National Board of Counterterrorism) or the government alone. Instead, there should be cooperation with non-government organizations, including the civil society (CNN Indonesia, 2015)

National Board of Counterterrorism is an organization that handles several domains of terrorism mitigation namely policy formulation, coordination establishment, and national anti-terrorism program design, which covers the aspects of counselling and preventing. The prevention program is emphasized on:

1. The house of prayer empowerment;

2. The high school education institution empowerment;

3. The religion education and high education;

4. Convicts and ex-convicts of terrorism family empowerment;

5. Literacy media empowerment.

Departing from the above explanation, it is clear that the cooperation between government institutions and the society in the domain of counterterrorism should be improved. The Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law, and Security Wiranto states that there should be concerted efforts from all ministries and institutions in dealing with the problems of terrorism in Indonesia. In addition, Wiranto also suggests that the solution to this problem of terrorism should not only be afforded by the Indonesian Police Department but also by all national components. Moreover, Wiranto asserts that the handling of terrorism demands concerted efforts and coordination from all ministries and institutions in the Republic. Not to mention, the handling of terrorism should also involve all political and civil society organizations.

Up to date, there are more than 600 ex-convicts of terrorism who have been released from correctional institutions. The treatment for these ex-convicts of terrorism should be appropriate so that they do not return to the old terrorism network. At the same time, the National Board of Counterterrorism expects that the returnees or the Indonesian citizens who have returned from Syria because of their engagement in ISIS should also be properly treated. The reason is that the National Board of Counterterrorism has provided relevant data to the Department of Domestic Affairs so that all government apparatus from the central level to the village level might monitor and submit necessary reports about the activities of these returnees (Kompas, 2019 & 2018).

Furthermore, the National Board of Counterterrorism expects that the Department of Domestic Affairs monitors all ex-convicts of terrorism and map which community that should be anticipated and which community that should be monitored further. In this regard, a better cooperation is expected to achieve in detecting the potentials of radical terrorism since regional governments have the data and channel at village level.

Indeed, deradicalization program is important to implement considering the fact that nowadays 20% of the ex-convicts of terrorism have become terrorists again after they have been released from correctional institutions. On the other hand, other data indicate that from 2000 until 2018 approximately 1,799 people became the perpetrators of terrorism and from this figure 906 people have been sentenced and released from correctional institutions while 52 other people have perpetrated the act of terrorism again.

Deradicalization program by means of rehabilitation has two meanings, which are independency development and personality development. The independency development aims at training and developing the ex-convicts of terrorism in order to equip them with special skills and expertise so that they will be able to provide employment opportunity after having been released from correctional institutions. On the other hand, the personality development aims at pursuing dialogue-based approach among the ex-convicts of terrorism so that their mindset might be straightened, that they will have comprehensive understanding and accept different entities living among them (Law and Human Rights Development Agency, 2016; Golese, 2009).

Deradicalization programs by means of rehabilitation should be implemented to the ex-convicts of terrorism who are undergoing or who have undergone their sentence. At the same time, the rehabilitation process should be able to assess the motive of the terrorism perpetrators and understand the role of the perpetrators in their network. The network of the terrorism consists of several layers. The first layer is the core group, which is very radical. Then, the second layer is cooperative group, including the supporting group, which is less radical. Eventually, the third layer is the sympathetic group, which consists of the sympathizers.

Although the results have been apparent, the deradicalization that has been performed is not maximal yet. The implementation of rehabilitation and social reintegration has not resulted in optimum results. The ill-success of the development toward the ex-convicts of terrorism might be viewed from the number of recidivists who have committed their actions again. The doctrine that has been adopted by these convicts of terrorism is difficult to replace despite the fact that they have undergone the development process in correctional institutions.

In relation to these findings, a Moslem scholar and academician. Prof. Dr. Jamhari Makruf, a Professor from Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta, in an interview on May 14th, 2020, states that he does not completely believe in the deradicalization that takes the form of debates, argumentations that the understanding of these terrorists is wrong, invitation for the Moslem theologian or cleric to give understanding, and alike. Instead, he says that this model has been less effective (Makruf, 2020).

Makruf argues that a more effective model might be about how to cut the activities of this group so that this group does not have any strong network and how to invite these radical people into an association with more moderate people. People who have been exposed to radicalism should not have discussions with people from their group; instead, the radical people should be provided with more space so that they will meet and be engaged with more people from various backgrounds so that they will gain more perspectives.

As an academician, Makruf further argues that the National Board of Counterterrorism should establish cooperation with the civil society. It will be better if the National Board of Counterterrorism operates in more strategic domains, policy formulation, and civil society coordination that deal with the domain of deradicalization. At the same time, Makruf suggests that the National Board of Counterterrorism should coordinate and synergize the inter-ministry government programs so that the implementation of these programs might be synergic without any overlap or repetition. This initiative will be better than the position of the National Board of Counterterrorism as the direct actor/executor.

Technically, Makruf suggests that the government through the National Board of Counterterrorism as the leading sector in the counterterrorism initiative should cover the gap in the Board by hiring academicians for performing studies in the domain of radicalism and terrorism. According to Makruf, these academicians will be more productive with the results of their studies rather than the staffs in the National Board of Counterterrorism who have been serving the country for years. The reason is that these staffs consider their job as part of administrative bureaucracy whereas the duty that should be carried by the National Board of Counterterrorism is defining strategic directions.

Eventually, Makruf also suggests that the National Board of Counterterrorism should function as the coordinator and the policy maker in order to provide feedback for the President. With reference to the statement, Makruf asserts that terrorism is a common enemy and, therefore, the society should be aware of it. The state is not able to handle the common enemy alone; so, the state should collaborate with the society and civil society organizations.

Based on the arguments that have been proposed by Makruf, it can be concluded that the counterterrorism program, especially the deradicalization, cannot be implemented solely by the government. The involvement of the civil society, including the academicians, is highly necessary. The encouragement to assign the National Board of Counterterrorism as the coordinator that operates at strategic level should be reinforced, while the front line of the counterterrorism should be handled by the civil society.

In a similar vein, Arijani Lasmawati, an academician from the University of Indonesia who has been working as a clinical psychology in the study of terrorism, in an interview on May 9th, 2020, mentions that the act of terror has not been caused by mental disorder that the perpetrators have. In her opinion, a psychopath will do anything to satisfy his or her desire while a terrorist perpetrates an act of terror under a political agenda and aspiration they consider noble. Therefore, Lasmawati suggests that there should be personal approach to each of ex-convicts of terrorism so that their true needs can be identified. By accommodating these needs, the ex-convicts of terrorism might be prepared to return into their life with a better society (Lasmawati, 2020).

Then, Lasmawati also suggests that the deradicalization program should involve many parties, including close relatives, religious figures, academicians, and other figures in accordance with the needs of the ex-convicts of terrorism. In a correctional institution, the officer who accompanies the convicts of terrorism should be equipped with the capacity to identify the needs of each convict. Each convict of terrorism has different needs and, therefore, there should be personal approach. In relation to the situation, the academicians might play a significant role by providing additional briefing to the correctional institution officers who accompany the convicts of terrorism.

The perspective of the clinical psychologist shows that the deradicalization programs should be designed in cooperation with parties who are able to identify the psychological aspects, especially the needs of each convict of terrorism. This situation indicates that the space of involvement for the academicians, especially the ones who have the background of Psychology, is highly necessary in the deradicalization program in Indonesia.

Another academician from President University who has been active in the domain of deradicalization, Muhammad A.S. Hikam, in an interview on May 10th, 2020, states that the potential threat of terrorism is still high in Indonesia. Hikam mentions that terrorism is still a real threat for the national security and it might imply that the deradicalization program has not been effective in teaching a lesson to the terrorists who have been sentenced.

Hikam further explains that the current phenomenon does not imply that the sentence that the perpetrators of terrorism have undergone is stricter but the supervision toward the ex-convicts of terrorism is less strict. In his opinion, it is very possible that the ex-convicts of terrorism join the other terrorist group after they have been released from correctional institutions or that they have not been aware of their mistake; instead, these ex-convicts of terrorism have been more emboldened (encouraged) to perpetrate the act of terror as they put more faith onto their ideology and action.

In details, Hikam suggests that there are two types of deradicalization, which are hard deradicalization measures and soft deradicalization measures. For the ex-convicts of terrorism, both measures should be implemented. The reason is because these ex-convicts show levels of ideologization that can be accepted. Taking this situation into account, the hard measures are highly important to implement in the form of strict monitoring and supervision although the ex-convicts of terrorism have been released from correctional institutions.

Furthermore, Hikam suggests that the implementation of the hard measures should be adjusted to the degree of their involvement or the degree of their position in the radical organization or movement. At the same time, the soft measures should be pursued in the involvement of the civil society organization that performs re-education, social networking, and persuasive monitoring to the ex-convicts of terrorism. Within these soft measures, the disengagement from the hard-line groups should be afforded in terms of physical contact and information network.

In relation to the religious approach, Hikam mentions that the aspect that might be pursued is altering the way of understanding the religion by means of formal, informal, and non-formal education through the minimalization of any interpretation that tends to be intolerant. According to Hikam, this idea is not easy, but possible, to implement since most of the religious people basically adhere to the tolerant interpretation of religious teachings. Furthermore, Hikam states that this aspect has been a historical and cultural tradition although at the end of the 20th century the influence of fundamentalism has started to appear in all religions throughout Indonesia, including Islam.

Hikam also suggest that the religious institutions, religious figures, and religious civil society organizations should be able to establish cross-religion cooperation for strengthening and disseminating the religious tolerance by means of actual reinterpretation and actual ministry. At the same time, Hikam also promotes more cross-religion programs, especially in the domain of education, that target the lowest level (grassroots) to the highest level.

With regard to the collaboration in counterterrorism, it is suggested that the Government should place itself more as the supporter in the efforts of establishing deradicalization movement in the civil society. It is only in counterterrorism cases that the Government should be as powerful as possible to stay in the front line by using the security, legal, and intelligence apparatus. In the soft deradicalization measures, the initiative and the systematic work should be pursued by the civil society organizations, starting from educational institutions, civil society organizations, media, scholar associations, and religious associations.

From the interview session with Hikam, it can be concluded that deradicalization by means of collaborative approach between the government and the civil society should be pursued and this includes the collaboration with academicians or educational institutions. In fact, Hikam encourages a stronger role of non-state actors in comparison to the state actors within the process of deradicalization.

Another academician from the University of Indonesia who has been actively assisting the government, Sapto Priyanto, in an interview on May 26th, 2020, also delivers a similar insight by stating that the deradicalization academicians have implemented has generated better results because this deradicalization initiative has undergone the relevant research methodology. Priyanto admits that the Institution of Psychological Research, the Centre of Police Science Research the University of Indonesia, and the Special Detachment 88 are the first institutions that implement his deradicalization toward the convicts of terrorism, the ex-convicts of terrorism, their family, and their network (Priyanto, 2020)

In this program, Sapto Priyanto has implemented friendly approach; in this approach, he treated the convicts and ex-convicts of terrorism as family, relatives, and friends equally in terms of humanity and fraternity. Through the implementation of this program, Priyanto has gained recognition from some ex-convicts of terrorism, who state that the activities by the National Board of Counterterrorism have been formal and the staffs in the National Board of Counterterrorism have kept the distance with them.

However, Priyanto admits that there are several obstacles in the context of collaboration between the academicians and the government within the counterterrorism in Indonesia. In his opinion, the cooperation with the Special Detachment 88 and the General Directory of Correctional Institution has worked well but there has not been any official cooperation with the National Board of Counterterrorism as the leading sector in the counterterrorism initiative. At the same time, Priyanto also mentions that not all staffs in the National Board of Counterterrorism understand the situations of terrorism in Indonesia. With reference to the statement, the inflexible funding should be made more flexible with regards to the dynamics that have been found in the field and this also includes the flexibility in time allocation.

As an academician who has experiences in the deradicalization program, Priyanto suggests that the deradicalization should be implemented under a single command (collaboration) because until today the implementation of the deradicalization initiative is still partial. In addition, the National Board of Counterterrorism should implement the radicalization to the convicts of terrorism at the middle and the high level (the core and the militant group) instead of the low level (the supporters and the sympathizers). At the same time, Priyanto also suggests the government to involve experts, academicians, and practitioners who have field experiences. From the aspect of institutionalization, Priyanto recommends that the National Board of Counterterrorism should serve as a regulator and coordinator / regulator instead of an executor. This recommendation is based on the fact that the acceptance on the part of the convicts of terrorism toward the National Board of Counterterrorism is low. Therefore, Priyanto expects that the quality and the quantity of the National Board of Counterterrorism staffs should be improved especially in relation to terrorism.

The arguments delivered by Priyanto, an academician with long history in the domain of deradicalization program, show that the role of academicians within the deradicalization program in Indonesia is highly important. In fact, together with institutions in the University of Indonesia, studies that have been conducted might serve as a reference for the government in running the deradicalization program. However, there has not been any official cooperation between National Board of Counterterrorism as the leading sector in the domain of counterterrorism and the university as reflected by the results of the studies.

One of the ex-terrorism convicts who used to attend the deradicalization program is Nasir Abas, who was detained for 11 months and released in February 2014. In an interview on Sunday, February 17th, 2019, Nasir states that during the 11-month detainment, there was personal approach by several police officers. This personal approach has made Nasir Abas tolerant and not radical anymore. Eventually, Nasir becomes an agent of change and with the team established by Prof. Sarlito (University of Indonesia) assists the government to run the deradicalization program since 2006 (Nasir, 2019).

Nasir argue that the deradicalization program should not only be implemented by the National Board of Counterterrorism but also be delegated to the institutions or the NOGs that operate in the deradicalization program. The National Board of Counterterrorism has been considered as an enemy by the terrorists and, therefore, it will be difficult to implement the deradicalization program without the assistance of other parties.

The argument by the ex-convict of terrorism strictly asserts that the deradicalization program is difficult to be directly implemented by the National Board of Counterterrorism. However, the deradicalization program might be more successful when academicians are involved as demonstrated by Nasir who became a participant of the deradicalization program by academicians from the University of Indonesia.

On the contrary, an ex-convict of terrorism named Sofyan Tsauri, who was interviewed on June 26th, 2020, states that the deradicalization program that the government has implemented tends to fail. The reason is that the ex-convicts who would like to attend the deradicalization program are pragmatic and opportunistic. He further states that the deradicalization program does not reach their understanding, provides low economic incentives, and does not touch the main issue. As a result, the convicts of terrorism tend to play safe by attending the deradicalization program that the government has implemented so that they will not be considered radical anymore (Tsauri, 2020).

Tsauri, who was once a member of the Indonesian Police Department, mentions that the deradicalization program should not be implemented by either the Government or the National Board of Counterterrorism because both institutions have been considered as enemies. As an alternative, the deradicalization program should be implemented by external parties such as ex-convicts of terrorism who have not been radical anymore, public figures of all religions, and even from the relatives.

The confession from Tsauri has indicated the failure of the deradicalization program since the deradicalization program has been implemented by institutions that have been considered as enemies. According to Tsauri, if the deradicalization program is expected to succeed, external parties who have been considered neutral should be involved.

Another ex-convict of terrorism, Yudhi Zulfahri, in an interview on February 18th, 2018, states that during 5 years and 6 months in the detainment he was rarely exposed to the deradicalization program. Zulfahri, who is an alumnus of the State Academy Tourism Nusa Dua Bali, states that he left radicalism after he had gone through several independent reviews during the detainment. Furthermore, he states that he attended the deradicalization program in the National Board of Counterterrorism after having been released from the correctional institution.

According to Zulfahri, the deradicalization program should not only be implemented by the National Board of Counterterrorism, but also with the Regional Government. However, Zulfahri admits that there has been cooperation in the deradicalization program with the Ministry of Religion Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs but the collaboration has been less effective. Zulfahri expects that the deradicalization also touches the aspect of economic independency development so that the ex-convicts of terrorism might not be trapped into the radicalism again because they return to their group.

The confession of the ex-convicts of terrorism above shows that there have been limitations on the part of the actors involved in the deradicalization process. In the correctional institution, the warden who accompanies the convicts of terrorism everyday has limited capacity in terms of ideology. As a result, it is difficult for the warden to implement the deradicalization program toward the convicts of terrorism. Eventually, the deradicalization in the correctional institution becomes weak and tends to be ceremonial.

Referring to the arguments of Lasmawati, academicians who also work as psychologists should explain the importance of equipping correctional institution officers with the capacity to identify the needs of each convict of terrorism. Therefore, the statement of the ex-convicts of terrorism that during the detainment it is difficult to access the deradicalization program has confirmed the actual situations in the field. This statement strongly asserts that the role of academicians in the deradicalization program is highly significant.

The Director of Prevention the National Board of Counterterrorism, Brigadier General (Police) Ir. in an interview on March 1st, 2019, mentions the importance of academicians’ and educational institutions’ involvement in counterterrorism. It mentions that structurally the National Board of Counterterrorism has expert staffs although the number is still inadequate. These expert staffs are professors from well-known universities. The National Board of Terrorism routinely collects feedback from these expert staffs and every month the National Board of Terrorism holds a forum. The expert staffs are gathered by the Head of the National Board of Counterterrorism and then the National Board of Counterterrorism receives feedback that these professors provide.

It also explains that outside the structure of the National Board of Terrorism there are many interactions with academicians in seminars. In these seminars, the academicians become the source and automatically an interaction between the academicians and the National Board of Counterterrorism has been established. In this interaction, the academicians provide feedback and criticisms with regards to the counterterrorism programs by the National Board of Counterterrorism.

The success of deradicalization might be measured by observing whether or not the program has altered the mind of the participants. By altering the mind of the participants, who are the convicts and ex-convicts of terrorism, there are several benefits that might be gained. First, the convicts and the ex-convicts of terrorism can be reintegrated into the society and they can also take participation in the society throughout any event during the reintegration. Second, the convicts and the ex-convicts of terrorism might be accepted by the society without any stigmatization. Third, the convicts and the ex-convicts of terrorism might be returned to their initial state prior to joining the activities of terrorism. Fourth, the convicts and the ex-convicts of terrorism might internalize new life skills obtained from rehabilitation process in which they are able to socialize and cooperate with other people outside their groups in correctional institutions and with general communities in the society. Fifth, the convicts and ex-convicts of terrorism are able to admit their mistakes in the past. Sixth, the convicts and ex-convicts of terrorism are able to criticize themselves, develop themselves, embrace people from different groups, empower themselves, and be critical and tolerant. Seventh, the convicts and ex-convicts of terrorism are able to display the practice of religious teachings that show compassion for the fellow mankind, that create harmony amidst the society, and that displays willingness to pray with the other convicts in correctional institutions. Eighth, the convicts and ex-convicts of terrorism are able to acknowledge the Indonesian local wisdom, embrace the nationalism insight, be aware of the governing law, and admit and pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia. Last, the convicts and ex-convicts of terrorism are able to start a new life, internalize fundamental skills, or gain independency for earning livings in order to support their daily life (Mareta, 2018)

From the above elaboration, collaboration should be proposed in the form of a more comprehensive model. One of the collaboration models considered suitable for the deradicalization model is the collaborative governance. The principles of collaborative governance might be elaborated in the context of deradicalization program in accordance with the perspective of the academicians, the results of the interviews with the ex-convicts of terrorism and the officials of the National Board of Counterterrorism.

Principle engagement, as the first component of collaborative governance, has been met and implemented in the deradicalization program in Indonesia. The National Board of Counterterrorism as the leading sector in the counterterrorism and the statement by the President of the Republic of Indonesia Mr. Joko Widodo that terrorist is a common enemy encourage stakeholders and Indonesian people to be actively involved in the counterterrorism, especially in the context of the study that is deradicalization program.

Shared motivation, which consists of the elements of trust, commitment, legitimation, and shared understanding, in the collaborative governance of terrorist deradicalization in Indonesia, might be considered as being quite strong. The desire to make Indonesia free from terrorism becomes the main motivation of the stakeholders. However, there should be a creation of shared understanding and commitment that becomes the strong foundation for the implementation of collaborative governance especially in the deradicalization program. This aspect should be achieved considering the fact that the deradicalization should not only be implemented by the National Board of Counterterrorism as the leading sector in the counterterrorism initiative.

Capacity for Joint Action, which consists of the elements of common procedures and agreement, leadership, knowledge, and resources in the collaborative governance of deradicalization in Indonesia, should be improved. The most fundamental aspect is the capacity of the Correctional Institution in implementing the deradicalization during the sentence. The sentence is the most suitable period in which the ex-convicts of terrorism undergo deradicalization because these convicts fall under the quite strict regulation and control. However, if the capacity of the correctional institution officers, especially in the aspects of deradicalization, is insufficient then the deradicalization toward the convicts of terrorism will be difficult to implement (Zulfahri, 2019). Another problem in this aspect is related to the program funding, especially if the deradicalization program is implemented after the terrorist has completed the sentence. Without the necessary budget, the ex-convicts of terrorism might not be properly handled.

Actions in the collaborative governance of the deradicalization program in Indonesia have been implemented during the deradicalization in both the detainment and release. However, these actions are partial and have not been a movement coordinated under the National Board of Counterterrorism. The problems of terrorism are still considered as the responsibility of the National Board of Counterterrorism while there are so many parties that should be involved in handling the problems of terrorism such as the Ministry of Domestic Affairs and the Regional Government; both institutions oversee the regions throughout Indonesia and hold the authority in the society development. Due to the partial actions, terrorist deradicalization results in less optimal results.

Impacts and Adaptation for Collaboration Dynamics, or the temporary impacts that might be adapted into the act of collaboration in relation to the deradicalization, refer to, for example, the revision of legislation which aims at strengthening the function of counterterrorism and terrorism handling in Indonesia. The temporary impact that takes place in a positive direction is, for example, the presence of the ex-convicts of terrorism who become the agent of change within the deradicalization program that has been held by the University of Indonesia. The adaptation that has been pursued, such as the improvement of the correctional institution officers by the National Board of Counterterrorism, has already started.

The involvement of academicians in the deradicalization will be more appropriate if the collaborative governance concept is implemented. The assumption is based on the fact that the collaborative governance is a structured process in the management or the formulation of the public policy decision that constructively involves actors from various backgrounds in the government, public institutions, private institutions, and the civil society for achieving the public objectives that demand concerted efforts.

The collaborative governance is not solely limited to the formal level and the state creation. The collaborative governance serves as a process and structure in the decision-making and the public policy management that entail the civil society constructively by crossing the boundaries of the public institutions, government, and/or public environment, private environment, and state administration in order to implement the public objectives that demand the concerted efforts. This model will be suitable if the deradicalization program involves academicians because the non-formal manners might be implemented so that the deradicalization might be accepted by the convicts or the ex-convicts of terrorism. This statement has been proven by the deradicalization program that the University of Indonesia has implemented.

In relation to the involvement of the academicians as part of the civil society in the deradicalization program, such involvement has been in accordance with the principles of collaborative governance which explain that the concept of collaborative governance also entails the type of community-based collaborative, which altogether proceeds the resource management and the inter-governmental collaborative. The involvement of academicians in the deradicalization program also aligns with the collaborative governance that might be applied or utilized for explaining the participative governance and the civic engagement.

Conclusion

The deradicalization of the convicts and ex-convicts of terrorism in Indonesia has not produced optimum results as indicated the fact that there are still acts of terror that the ex-convicts of terrorism perpetrate (recidivists). The fact that approximately 20% of ex-convicts of terrorism perpetrated acts of terror again after they have been released from correctional institution shows that the deradicalization program still suffers from drawbacks and should be improved.

The involvement of the non-state actors is beneficial for the deradicalization program in Indonesia. The statement has been confirmed by the University of Indonesia which has been able to deradicalize and even turned the ex-convicts of terrorism into the agents of change for their groups so that the members of their groups will not be radical anymore.

The model that might be proposed for the deradicalization program under the collaboration between the non-state actors and the state actors is the collaborative governance. This model supports the involvement of the non-state actors since the implementation of the collaborative governance involves various actors, including the ones from private institutions and the civil society, in order to achieve the public objectives that demand concerted efforts. Furthermore, the collaborative governance is not only limited to the formal order and not only held by the states. Rather, the collaborative governance supports the community-based collaborates and the civic engagement.

Eventually, the government should strengthen the legal foundation for the implementation deradicalization by means of collaborative governance model. Within the legal foundation, the role of each actor involved in the counterterrorism, including the role of the academicians who have brought about the good results in counterterrorism initiative, should be made clear (*).

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